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ABSTRACT
I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Many economic applications involve institutions in which a planner is interested
in maximizing a certain objective function, but cannot force the agents to (i)
participate, and (ii) take the “right” actions that maximize its objective. Instead,
it has to design the adequate “rules of the game” such that when the agents take
the actions that satisfy their own interest, the final outcome is the one desired by
the planner. In some situations the planner can establish side payments amongst
the participant agents to achieve its objective (e.g. an auction, implementation
of a public project, etc), whereas in others, it is legally and socially impossible
to do so (e.g. allocation of students to colleges, assignment of kidney transplant
donors to patients, etc). The former problems are studied under the literature of
mechanism design, whereas the analysis of the latter have resulted in the emerging
literature of market design.
The design of such institutions have a clear impact on the welfare of agents
who participate, and therefore, it is very important to count with theoretical
and empirical tools that permit to (i) rigorously analyze the current institutions,
(ii) to design which would be the optimal frameworks, and (iii) provide policy
recommendation to practitioners. This dissertation aims to this objective in two
different environments: in the assignment of students to colleges (majors), and in
an auction under securities and externalities.
In the first two chapters we analyze the problem of assigning students to col-
leges (majors) in a centralized system. This is relevant because in many countries
around the world, university seats are allocated using a centralized protocol where
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students report preferences over colleges (majors) to a planner, and the planner
uses such reports -a long with an admission score- as the inputs of a serial dicta-
torship mechanism to assign students to colleges (majors).
The design of such admission systems are under the scrutiny of policy makers,
because the mismatch between students and colleges (majors) have an impact of
the productivity of individuals and the economy itself. However, little is known
of how different admission policies affect assignments. The first chapter addresses
this important question. It provides a new methodology to evaluate counterfactual
admission policies with respect to students’ welfare.
As a sub-product, we introduce a novel methodology to recover students’ pref-
erences from their reports. The importance of this observation lies in the fact that
normally, students are constrained to report fewer options than the total of options
available, and hence they do not have a weakly dominant strategy. In fact, for
many students their optimal strategy involves the manipulation of their reports
(i.e report something different to their true preferences), which imposes a chal-
lenge for the inference problem. That is, how to obtain students’ true preferences
from the manipulated reports.
We implement our methodology using a unique data set from the University
of Costa Rica. In particular we examine different counterfactuals such as the
welfare effects of (i) increasing the number of options to report, (ii) reallocating
seats across majors, and (iii) implementing different affirmative action programs.
Finally, we go beyond the serial dictatorship algorithm and introduce a mechanism
based on a simultaneous ascending auction.
The second chapter aims to answer a design question of the latter environment:
Why do planners around the world restrict the students’ choice? In other words,
why do planners do not let students to report the full list of preferences? This
2
question is relevant because when students can report the full list of preferences
the serial dictatorship mechanism is well known to have desirable properties. For
instance, it is a weakly dominant strategy for students to report the truth. More-
over, the final allocation is Pareto optimal and free of envy. However, as soon as
students are restricted, these desirable properties disappear. The puzzle comes
from the fact that with nowadays resources, the cost of letting students to report
the full list is negligible.
The second chapter provides an answer to this puzzle. It establishes that when
the planner itself has preferences over the assignment of students, and students are
sufficiently risk averse, then it is optimal for the planner to restrict students’ choice;
provided that planner and students preferences are completely misaligned (i.e.
the most preferred option from students’ perspective is the worst from planner’s
perspective and viceversa.)
The last chapter analyzes an auction when the final payment from the winner
to the seller is contingent to the realization of the project or asset being auctioned
off by the seller, or the so-called, auctions under securities. In this context we
introduce negative externalities to investigate how the interaction of the securities
and the externalities impact seller’s expected revenue. To simplify the analysis,
we center our attention to second price auctions and four instruments (i) cash,
(ii) equity (i.e where the bids are shares over future project’s revenue), (iii) a
fixed-equity hybrid, where the seller fixes the amount of cash he will request from
the winner, but let the bidders to compete in cash in the auction; and (iv) a
fixed-cash hybrid, where the seller fixes the equity that he will request from the
winner, but let the bidders to compete in equity in the auction. We show that
the fixed-equity hybrid is the instrument that yields the highest expected revenue,
whereas equity yields the lowest. Absent of the externality, equity give the highest
3
expected revenue, a result well known in the literature. That is, we show that when
externalities are present, the conclusion that securities that are more sensitive to
bidders’ true types (i.e steeper securities) do not necessarily yield the highest
expected revenue.
4
Chapter 2
CENTRALIZED ASSIGNMENT OF STUDENTS TO MAJORS: EVIDENCE
FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF COSTA RICA
Many countries use a centralized admission system, by which students are ad-
mitted to a university. Examples include Chile, China, Costa Rica, Hungary, Iran,
Turkey, The Netherlands, Spain, etc. Typically, students report preferences over
colleges to a social planner, and the planner allocates students to colleges. Such
admission systems are under constant scrutiny by policy makers, because ineffi-
ciencies in the assignments can have negative consequences on students’ careers
and, so, on economic productivity.
Countries exhibit variation in these centralized admissions policies. (For in-
stance, there is variation in the number of options a student can report, as well
as in the affirmative action programs considered.) However, little is known about
how changes to such policies impact the allocation of students to colleges. This
paper uses a novel dataset from the University of Costa Rica’s (UCR’s) 2008 ad-
missions process, to evaluate the impact of different admissions policies on how
students are assigned to majors. In doing so, we propose a new methodology to
recover students’ preferences, and conduct several counterfactual analyses.
In UCR, each student is assigned a score based on the results of a standardized
test and high school grades. Students privately observe their score and then report
an ordered list of majors to the Registrar Office (henceforth, RO). The RO uses
the serial dictatorship mechanism to allocate students to majors. This mechanism
assigns students to majors based on their scores and reported preferences. Roughly
speaking, it orders students by their scores and assigns them to their best major,
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among those with available seats.
If students were allowed to report their complete preferences over all available
majors, then they would have a weakly dominant strategy to report truthfully. In-
deed, for any given reported list, the serial dictatorship mechanism starts revising
the major in the highest position reported to try to allocate the student to that
major. If it is not possible, it turns to the second highest major reported, and
so on. Therefore, there is nothing better than report the true preferences when
students can express preferences over all options available. However, UCR only
allows students to report two options. As such, students may have an incentive
to misreport their true preferences over majors.
This raises a challenge for the inference problem: To evaluate alternate policies,
the researcher needs to obtain students’ preferences over majors. Because the
students are constrained to report only two options, there are two challenges.
First, students report an ordered list over two majors, which can be manipulated.
Second, even if the reports were truthful, the researcher only observes a truncated
order over majors.
We address this challenge by introducing a multi-agent decision approach. The
crucial observation is that the student’s decision problem is conceptually simple.
To understand why, we first note that the outcome of the admissions process
induces a threshold score associated with each major. A threshold is a value such
that students with lower scores cannot obtain a seat in the given major. UCR
publishes information about past threshold scores. In the data, these scores are
stable from year to year. Students can use this information along with their own
scores to estimate the probability of admission to any major. Armed with this
information, students report an ordered list that maximizes their expected utility.
This multi-agent decision approach is founded on the idea that students act
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in a large population of applicants. Therefore, they do not believe that their own
reports affect their probability of admission to any given major.
We use the multi-agent decision approach to recover students’ preferences.
This is done in two steps. First, we recover the students’ ordinal preferences over
majors. Second, we use the ordinal preferences to recover the students’ cardinal
preferences. (The cardinal preferences are necessary, because students maximize
their expected utility given the estimated probabilities.)
First, we provide a “revealed preference algorithm” to recover a minimal set
of ordinal preferences that are compatible with the data. To do so, we assume
that preferences are independent of scores. In addition, we impose two axioms of
rationality on the student’s choice: no cycles and no-dominated choice. This allows
us to use the students’ reports and past threshold scores to obtain their ordinal
preferences. In particular, students with scores above the highest threshold are
guaranteed admissions to any major. As a consequence, they have an incentive to
report truthfully. Their report, thus, constitutes the beginning of a specific ordinal
preference. We then look at students with scores just below the highest threshold,
and use their reports to continue reconstructing ordinal preferences. This process
is continued using the reports of students with lower and lower scores.
Second, we use the recovered ordinal preferences to obtain cardinal preferences.
Specifically, we assign initial cardinal values based on the ordinal preferences ob-
tained in the previous step. Then, we solve the student’s utility maximization
problem to obtain the set of optimal reports. With these reports in hand, we ap-
ply the serial dictatorship mechanism to simulate the assignments in each major.
If, in each major, the simulated assignment matches the actual assignment, then
the process is complete. If, in any given major, the simulated assignment is differ-
ent from the actual assignment, then cardinal utilities are adjusted according to
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a simple rule. Importantly, the adjusted values have to respect the initial ordinal
preference assignment.
An important caveat is in order: The procedure recovers a set of cardinal prefer-
ences that is consistent with the data. However, these preferences are not uniquely
identified. There may be several preference profiles that are observationally equiv-
alent. The non-uniqueness can arise in either of the two steps. Nonetheless, we
show that our procedure is robust to alternate specifications of preferences.
Overview of the Results We apply our methodology to the UCR dataset. It
contains information of approximately 10,000 students who applied for admission
in any of the 82 majors offered on the main campus.
We can trivially match both the students’ reports and assignments by allowing
each student to have a different preference profile. (For instance, we can give
each student a preference profile where their assigned major has a very large
cardinal utility in comparison with the others.) However, that approach would be
agnostic about the students ordinal preferences over the non-reported majors. As
a consequence, it cannot be used to conduct counterfactuals and evaluate policies.
Instead, we use the revealed preference algorithm. In doing so, we recover 205
different ordinal preferences. These are used to match the aggregate assignments
per major. We show that the recovered cardinal preferences fit the aggregate
assignments with 94% accuracy. This finding has merit per se, since the total
number of possible preference profiles is of the order of 10122.
We compare policies to a benchmark in which the RO uses a serial dictatorship
mechanism and allows the students to report their complete ordinal preferences.
This benchmark has three desirable properties. First, reporting truthfully is a
weakly dominant strategy (Dubins and Freeman
For any given policy, we compare the assignment under that policy to the
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assignment under the benchmark. We do so by focusing on three measures of how
the assignments differ. The first is the fraction of students that obtain a different
assignment from they would obtain under the benchmark. The second is the
euclidean norm between the cardinal utilities associated with the two assignments.
The third is the cardinal aggregate welfare.
Within the context of the serial dictatorship mechanism, we evaluate three
changes in policy: (i) an increase in the number of options to reports, (ii) affir-
mative action programs, and (iii) a reallocation of seats across majors. Later, we
depart from the serial dictatorship and allow the RO to employ a broader class of
mechanisms.
First, we look at the counterfactual in which the RO varies the number of
option that can be reported. When the RO limits the list of options to two, 72%
of the students receive a different allocation than they would obtain under the
benchmark. Increasing the number of options to report decreases the differences
in assignments. Likewise, it decreases the euclidean norm between the cardinal
utilities of the two assignments and it increases the cardinal welfare. The fact
that the cardinal welfare is increasing is non-trivial. When the RO increases the
number of options that can be reported, it both increases the probability that
middle-score students are assigned and decreases the probability that low-score
students are assigned. So, there could be a loss in welfare if middle-score students
are assigned to unpopular majors, for which low-score students have a higher
cardinal utility. In fact, because of this potential loss in welfare, Miralles
Second, we look at the impact of two affirmative action programs. The first
program sets quotas for the target population, and the second provides the target
population with a bonus in their admissions scores. We find that the bonus is
more effective in admitting students from the target population. However, it also
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produces larger distortions in the assignment of the overall population.
Third, we look at the effect of reallocating wasted seats (i.e. seats that were
not filled). We consider allocating these seats in three different ways: (i) to the
ten most demanded majors, (ii) to the five most demanded majors, or (iii) the
most demanded major (medicine). The simulations show that the first scheme
dominates the others. This likely indicates that there is high variability in the
students’ preferences.
Finally, we look at the effect of changing the mechanism, beyond the realm of
the serial dictatorship mechanism. We study two of such mechanisms. The first is,
what we call, the Posting Scores Upfront mechanism (PSU) and the second is an
Ascending Auction mechanism (AA). In the PSU, the RO announces a minimum
threshold required for admissions to any given major. Importantly, the RO com-
mits to this threshold, even if this requires creating additional seats. In the AA,
the RO announces a preliminary-threshold for admission to any given major, and
the students submit their “demand” for a seat. The planner then computes the
“excess demand” in each major, and adjusts the thresholds of some major with
maximal excess demand. The process is repeated until there are no majors with
excess demand. We show that the AA is highly desirable. In particular, under the
AA, only 5% of the students receive a different assignment from the benchmark.
Moreover, it delivers higher cardinal welfare than the benchmark.
Related Literature In a seminal paper, Balinski and Sonmez
There is also a growing literature that addresses the school choice problem
empirically. See, e.g., Hwang
In the college assignment problem (or the problem of assigning students to ma-
jors) a student’s priority is entirely determined by a score. Moreover, preferences
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are more idiosyncratic and can depend on both unobserved variables (e.g., taste)
and observed variables (e.g., wages, attrition rates, etc). These features make it
difficult to obtain unique identification, even if a parametric model were used. For
this reason, we introduce a non-parametric methodology based on the multi-agent
decision approach.
The multi-agent decision approach is based on the observation that students
act in a large population. As such, they take the probabilities of admission as
given. In other words, students do not believe that their own reports affect their
admission probabilities. Sönmez and Unver (2010) take a similar approach to
analyze the allocation of courses in business schools. The approach is also related
to the literature that analyzes admission systems as large economies. See, e.g.,
Chade, Lewis and Smith
Organization of the Paper The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the background about the higher education system in Costa Rica. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the model and points to comparative statics. Section 4 introduces
and implements the multi-agent decision approach. Section 5 describes the data
and presents descriptive statistics. Section 6 shows the simulation results. Section
7 conducts counterfactual analyses in the realm of the serial dictatorship mecha-
nism. Section 8 conducts counterfactuals beyond the serial dictatorship. Section
9 concludes.
2.1 Background
Higher Education in Costa Rica There are sixty three institutions of higher
education in Costa Rica, of which five are public, fifty three are private and five
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are international. 1 All public universities absorbs roughly 60% of the total en-
rollment in the country, and the UCR about 25%. 2 Altogether, higher education
institutions offer around 1,100 programs, but the academic offer is highly concen-
trated in the areas of social sciences, economic sciences and education. Moreover,
all the majors in hard sciences, and the majority of majors in arts and natural
resources are only offered in public universities. For instance, crucial majors for
the technological development of the country such as: pure mathematics, physics
and statistics are only offered by the UCR.
The admission process for the public universities is decentralized among uni-
versities but centralized within each university. That is, each institution uses their
own admission system, but the allocation of majors is centralized. In particular
the UCR uses a serial dictatorship mechanism to allocate students to majors. 3
All public universities have well established systems of scholarships that give
tuition waiver and financial assistance to all students who meet the requirements.
Among them, the program of the UCR stands out. As an illustration, in 2013
the UCR transferred around 23 million dollars in scholarships, that benefited 50%
of the enrolled population. The fraction of the beneficiaries increased to 60%
if the stimulus scholarships (i.e. those granted to students who participate in
athletic and cultural groups, or to students with excellent academic performance)
1The five public universities are: The University of Costa Rica (UCR) founded in 1940, the
Costa Rica Institute of Technology (ITCR) founded in 1971, the National University (UNA)
founded in 1973, the University of Distance Education (UNED) founded in 1977, and the Tech-
nical National University (UTN) founded in 2015. The UCR and UNA are comprehensive
universities which offer a large menu of majors in all academic areas, while ITCR and UTN
are specialized in engineering and technical majors. UNED is the main institution of distance
education.
2For more details see http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/educacion2015
3The UNA shares the same admission standardized exam with UCR, but uses a complicated
statistical-mathematical model that stratifies students by region and high-school of origin. The
ITCR applies its own exam and a similar admission system to the UCR. Meanwhile, the other
public universities, and all private universities do not require an admission exam.
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are considered. The tuition for students who do not receive financial assistance
is approximately 315 dollars per semester (for a maximum of twelve credits),
irrespectively of the major enrolled. This amount is considerably lower than the
mean cost of a semester in a private university, which is approximately 800 dollars
in majors that belongs to education or economic sciences; but can ascend up to
4,000 dollars in the case of medicine. 4
Finally, the UCR stands as the main actor in the production of innovation and
scientific knowledge in the region. It concentrates more than 51% of the main
researchers of the country -measured by the number and impact factor of their
publications, counts with forty six research centers, and edits thirty two academic
journals, covering all the academic areas. In contrast, private universities are
mainly focused in instruction, and their participation in the research life of the
country is negligible. 5
In summary, the UCR offers the most comprehensive menu of majors, give
scholarships to all students who meet the requirements, and is perceived as the
best university in the country. As a consequence, the seats it offers in almost
all majors are over demanded. Therefore, it has to use a mechanism to assign
students into majors that respect sutdents’ preferences and priorities.
Admission Process in the University of Costa Rica The admission pro-
cess at UCR is a centralized nationwide process that takes approximately eleven
months. For the academic year starting in March, the procedure starts in April
of the previous year, when potential incoming students pay the fee and register
to take the Academic Aptitude Test (APT); a standardized test that includes
4Recovered from http://www.nacion.com/archivo/Matricula-cursos-privadas. The
amounts were converted to dollar using the average exchange rate of 2013.
5For more details see http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/estado-ciencia-tecnologia
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logical-mathematical and verbal reasoning items. In June, students receive an ap-
pointment and practice material is distributed. The test is administered around
the country during August and September. Admission scores –which determine
students’ priorities in the admission mechanism- are privately communicated to
each student in November. 6
Only students with a score greater than 442 points are considered eligible,
and advance to the next phase in December, where they are asked to report an
ordered list of two major choices. 7 These are the reports that are considered by
the RO to run the admission mechanism and to generate the assignments, which
are publicized in January. Students who are not assigned a major are out of the
university
Once students are assigned a major they have to consolidate the courses they
will take in the incoming semester, since being enrolled in a major is a sine qua non
condition to take courses in the university. In fact, this requirement make many
students to apply to less desired majors but with high probability of admission,
with the sole purpose of being enrolled at the university, and thus able to take
courses. 8
6Admission scores are an equally weighted average of the GPA obtained in high school, and
of the score in the APT. Its range is 200-800 points. There are some majors with special require-
ments like music, painting or architecture, where students also need to approve a specialized
pretest in order to be eligible.
7Technically speaking, students have an additional option if they are willing to list his first
option in two different campuses, but this option is valid for the reduced menu of majors that
are also offered off the central campus. Moreover, students have also the possibility of deferring
his score for at most the next two years.
8In particular, they can take the courses in humanities that are part of the program of study
in all majors. Then, they could transfer to other majors retaking the APT, or taking part of a
very competitive internal process based on the GPA obtained in the first year of study.
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2.2 Theoretical Framework
We index students by s, s = 1, 2, · · · , S, and by an abuse of notation let
S represent the set of students; thus s ∈ S. Likewise, we index majors by m,
m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, and by the same convention let M also represent the set of
majors; thus m ∈ M . Each major m has a capacity of qm, given by the number
of seats available. We assume that ∑Mm=1 qm ≤ S, that is, at most there are as
many slots as needed to exactly accommodate all students. We let ∅ denotes the
no-major option, which vacuously satisfies q∅ = S.
Student s has private information about his score xs and his preferences over
majors s. The score xs is a scalar, whereas preferences s are represented by a
vector us = (u1s, · · · , uMs ), where u`s represents the utility of student s if he gets
major `.
The score of each student is observed by the RO, who utilizes them to prioritize
students in the admission process. Without loss of generality, we sort students in
decreasing order with respect to their scores. Thus, xs > xs′ if and only if s < s′.
Under this convention, the index of each student determines his priority, and so,
a student s has a priority higher than or equal to k if s ≤ k.
The RO has to choose a procedure to assign students into majors, such that
priorities are not violated. The standard procedure used by many universities
around the world works as follows. Students report an order of preferences to
the RO, which normally allows to list fewer options than the total number of
majors. Then, the RO runs a predefined algorithm to allocate majors, such that
if a student is not assigned he is given the no-major option. This process involves
a large degree of uncertainty for students, because they are given few options to
report, and their assignment depends on preferences and priorities of all other
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students.
A feasible allocation in this environment corresponds to a many-to-one match-
ing, namely a rule that assigns each student to at most one major, and such
that the number of students assigned to a given major is less than or equal to
its capacity. Here, each student’s report corresponds to a k-tuple over the set of
majors M , where 1 ≤ k < M . Thus, ms ∈ Mk. Therefore, given a profile of
reports m = (m1, · · · ,mS), the matching mapping φ gives the allocation φs(m)
to student s.
For each student s we writems(`) to refer the `th major reported inms. When
we want to make clear the dependence of the report to a specific parameter b, we
write m[b](`), nonetheless we omit this notation when it can be inferred from the
context.
Finally, we denote os as the vector that orders the majors according to student’s
true preferences us, and os(`) as his `th preferred major. Therefore, lettingm∗s be
the optimal report of student s, we say that an admission mechanism is strategy-
proof if m∗s(`) = os(`) for all ` = 1, · · · , k < M , s ∈ S and us.
Many of the countries listed in the introduction apply a serial dictatorship
mechanism. The description of the algorithm is as follows:
In step 1. The student with the highest score is considered. He is assigned a
seat at the major reported in the first position.
In step 2. The student with second highest score is considered. He is assigned
a seat at the major reported in the first position if there are available seats;
otherwise, he is assigned a seat at the major reported in the second position.
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In step ` (` > 2). The student with the `th highest score is considered. He is as-
signed a seat at the major reported in the highest position that has available seats.
The algorithm terminates when the reports of all students have been considered
or all the seats have been allocated.
When students are allowed to report a complete order over preferences, the
serial dictatorship mechanism is strategy-proof. However, when students are con-
strained, they have an incentive to misreport. That is the reason for using the
qualifier reported, instead of preferred, in the description of the serial dictatorship
above. Furthermore, without constraints, the serial dictatorship is Pareto-efficient
and free of justified envy. That is, no student with higher score prefers the assign-
ment of a student with lower score over his own assignment.
Despite of these desirable properties, many universities do not let students to
report a full list of preferences, and hence the game of incomplete information
induced by the mechanism does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
In fact, the only players that have a dominant strategy are the students with a
priority higher than or equal to the number of options to report. For the rest of
students we have to model a sophisticated decision problem, as we show in the
appendix 4.4.
2.2.1 Student’s Decision Problem
One important characteristic of this process is that students participate under
the same rules year after year, and so the series of equilibrium outcomes can
reveal information about population preferences and scores. Although not all the
information is available to students, normally the RO publicizes past threshold
scores in each major, which arguably encompasses all the relevant information
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about preferences and scores contained in previous admission processes. If such
data is available to students, it can be used along with their own current scores
to compute their vector of admission probabilities to each possible major.
Fixing the history of past threshold scores in each major, we denote η(m,x)
the ex-ante probability of getting admission into major m given a score of x.
Probabilities are non-decreasing in the score, that is, if s < s˜, then η(m,xs) ≥
η(m,xs˜).
Given a vector of cardinal utilities us and a score xs, student s chooses to
report an ordered k-tuple of majors to maximize his expected utility.
Notice that for a given report of student s, ms, either he gets into the first
major reported or he does not. If he is rejected, either he gets into the second
major reported or does not; and so on. Hence, define
r`−1(ms, xs) =

∏`−1
j=1 1− η(ms(j), xs) for ` = 2, · · · , k
1 for ` = 1
as the probability of not getting admission in any of the first ` − 1 majors listed
in the report ms. Notice that the order matters, since any major chosen imposes
an externality on the following majors in the order.
Thus, the expected utility of each student s can be written recursively as:
V (us, xs) = max
ms∈Mk
k∑
`=1
r`−1(ms, xs)η`su`s (2.1)
The structure of the decision problem is the same as in Chade and Smith
(2006), hence, the solution can be obtained using a greedy algorithm.
We denote m∗s a typical element of the arg max of V (us, xs). Once all stu-
dents solve their respective decision problem, it is possible to construct the profile
of optimal reports m∗ = (m∗1, · · · ,m∗S), which along with the selected mecha-
nism, endogenously determines assignments φ(m∗) = (φ1(m∗), · · · , φS(m∗)) and
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threshold scores t∗ = (t∗1, · · · , t∗M), where
t∗` = min{xs : φs(m∗) = `}, ∀` ∈M (2.2)
2.2.2 Comparative Statics
In this section we analyze what is the optimal behavior of a student if his
vector of admission probabilities “improves” or if he is allowed to report a higher
number of options.
Definition 1. The report ms is more aggressive than the report m˜s if ms 6= m˜s
and ms(`)  m˜s(`) for all ` = 1, · · · , k.
Theorem 1 (Chade and Smith . Assume that ηs and η˜s are two vector of ad-
mission probabilities such that (i) ηos(`)s ≥ η˜os(`)s for all ` = 1, · · ·M , and (ii)
η
os(`)
s
η˜
os(`)
s
> η
os(`+1)
s
η˜
os(`+1)
s
for all ` < M . Then, m∗s is more aggressive than m˜∗s.
Suppose there are two vector of admission probabilities for student s, η˜s and
ηs, such that the latter offers a higher probability of admission in each major, and
relatively favors the more preferred majors by student s. Theorem two states that
the optimal report of student s is more aggressive under ηs that under η˜s. That
is, he will report a weakly preferred major in each of the k slots given, and will
report a strictly preferred option in at least one of the positions. Notice that this
result is relative just to student s, since even though η˜s favors the more preferred
majors by student s, it does not necessarily hold for all students s˜ 6= s.
Proposition 1. Fix a vector of admission probabilities ηs and let k < k˜ be two
different number of options to report. Then, the optimal report ms,[k˜] truncated to
the first k majors is more aggressive than the report ms,[k].
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 1 in Chade and Smith
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Proposition 1 says that given a vector of probabilities ηs, if the number of
options increases, student s will become more aggressive using the first k slots to
report weakly preferred majors. The intuition for this result resides in the fact
that if an additional option is given then the student either (i) will use it to report
a safety school in the marginal slot given, which does not change the report of the
first k positions, or (ii) will report a better option in the first k slots with respect
to his previous report, and will use the marginal slot to report a safety option (i.e.
a major with higher probability of admission).
2.2.3 Justified Envy and Strtegy Proofness in the Large
As we discussed in the introduction, when students are not allowed to report
the complete list of preferences, the mechanism induced by the serial dictatorship
algorithm is not strategy-proof. We now investigate if it satisfies a weaker notion
of strategy-proofness called strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L).
The SP-L concept was introduced by Azevedo and Budish
As the authors point it out, this concept is stronger than a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, because truthful reporting is a best response against any probabil-
ity distribution, and not only the distribution associated with the corresponding
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In fact, Budish and Azevedo show that several well
known mechanisms that are not strategy-proof are SP-L.
In our realm, the admission mechanism would be SP-L if for any vector of
admission probabilities, saying the truth were a dominant strategy. It is clearly
not the case. Consider for example a student with cardinal utilities that strictly
order all the majors, but such that the difference between the maximum and
minimum cardinal utility is sufficiently small. Furthermore, suppose probabilities
are strictly increasing in the reverse order of the students’ preferences (i.e. the
20
most preferred major has the lowest admission probability, and so on). Then,
the student has an incentive to report the majors with higher probabilities of
admission even though they are not the most preferred.
Another recurrent concept in the analysis of the admission mechanism is the
no-justified envy property (cf. Balinski and Sonmez
Our admission mechanism also fails the no-justified envy test. Indeed, suppose
that students are only allowed to report two options as in the UCR, and that being
out of college is strictly worse than studying any major. Then, take two students
s and s˜ with low adjacent scores (hence very similar probabilities of admission)
but such that student s has very strong cardinal utilities for very popular (over
demanded) majors, whereas student s˜ is indifferent among all majors. Then, it is
very likely that, ex-post, the student s envies the allocation of student s˜. In fact,
in section 4.4 we compute the proportion of students with ex-post justified envy
in our simulation.
2.3 Multi-agent Decision Approach
In this section, we present how to implement the multi-agent decision prob-
lem when the researcher has access to a data set that contains admission scores,
reports, assignments and threshold scores.
The main goal of this exercise is to recover the crucial non-observable variable
of our model: students’ preferences over majors. One uninteresting case is to assign
a different profile of preferences to each student. In that way, for a given vector
of probabilities it is always possible to properly select very high cardinal utilities
for the majors reported, so that the solution of (2.1) coincides with the observed
report. This option would violate the fact that some students tend to have similar
preferences, and so that a few preference profiles can capture the decision process
21
in a parsimonious way. Moreover, the preferences recovered would be useless to
conduct counterfactual analysis in a robust way.
We propose the following algorithm to recover cardinal preferences.
2.3.1 Admission Probabilities
The distinctive feature of the model introduced in section 3.2 is that students
take into account past threshold scores to compute their admission probabilities
to each major: η(m,xs).
Let Tm be the series of past threshold scores. We assume that Tm follows a
truncated normal distribution for each major m, and check such assumption by
conducting a Jarque-Bera and a Wilk-Shapiro test on the series of values corre-
sponding to the period 2000 − 2014. In almost all the majors without missing
values, the null hypothesis of normality is not rejected.
Now, given the normality assumption, students compute admission probabili-
ties as follows
η(m,xs) =
Φ((xs − µm))/σm)− Φ((tminm − µm))/σm)
Φ((tmaxm − µm))/σm)− Φ((tminm − µm))/σm)
Here, Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of standard normal vari-
able, whereas µm, σm, tminm and tmaxm correspond –respectively– to the mean, stan-
dard deviation, minimum and maximum of Tm for each major m. 9
2.3.2 Students’ Optimal Portfolio
Once probabilities are obtained from the data, we solve student’s decision prob-
lem stated in (2.1). In general, this problem is fairly complicated, since it entails
9The computed probabilities do not vary significantly if we assume that the series of past
threshold scores follows a uniform distribution instead.
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the maximization of a submodular function over a finite set of alternatives –an
NP hard problem (Lovász, 1982). However, we can use the Marginal Improve-
ment Algorithm (MIA) introduced by Chade and Smith (2006). In short, MIA
is a greedy algorithm that looks for the option that yields the highest marginal
increment in the expected utility at each stage. First, for given student s it sets
the initial portfolio m0s = ∅ and searches for the option with the largest expected
utility. That is, it chooses a major m1s ∈ arg maxm∈M η(m,xs)ums and then up-
dates the optimal portfolio to m1s = m0s ∪ {m1s}. In step `, ` ≥ 2 it chooses the
option m`s ∈ arg maxm∈M\{m`−1s } η(m,xs)ums and updates the optimal portfolio to
m`s = m`−1s ∪ {m`s}. In other words, at each stage the algorithm picks the major
that yields the largest marginal benefit over the portfolio of majors constructed so
far, and updates the optimal portfolio recursively. It stops when it has chosen the
k locally optimal options. The authors show that the optimal solution provided
by MIA coincides with the global solution of the original maximization problem,
and moreover, that it reaches its solution in a quadratic number of steps.
As pointed out by Fack et al.
To study the assignment problem of students to secondary schools in Ghana,
Ajayi
2.3.3 Allocations and Threshold Scores
Now, when students’ optimal reports m∗ are computed as described above,
they are considered the inputs of a serial dictatorship mechanism, whose solution
becomes the final assignment. Given the final assignments, the threshold score for
major m corresponds to the score obtained by the last student admitted to this
major, as shown in equation (2.2).
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2.3.4 Adjustment of Preferences
The initial cardinal utilities are adjusted according to the performance of the
algorithm with respect to the actual assignment in the data. Specifically, for each
major we compute the difference between the simulated aggregate assignment and
the actual aggregate assignment. If for a given major such difference is positive,
it means that the simulation is assigning more students than desired. Then, pref-
erences of all students for such major are adjusted down by a factor of δ > 0 .
That is, if for a given student s the preference for major m is given by ums , the
new preferences would be u˜ms = ums − δ after the adjustment. If on the other hand
the difference is negative, the new preferences would be u˜ms = ums + δ.
The adjustment procedure has to satisfy one additional requirement: it has
to preserve the order of the majors in the profile (such order is obtained by the
algorithm described in section 2.3.5). That is, it is not possible to adjust upward
the cardinality of a major such that it surpasses the position of his neighbor above.
Likewise, the cardinality cannot be adjusted downward so that is falls below its
neighbor underneath.
In general, the process continues until the assignments observed in data are
perfectly matched or ten thousand iterations are run, whatever happens first.
10 The final preferences of such numerical exercise are considered the students’
preferences that rationalize choices, and thus they become the primitives of the
model to conduct future counterfactual analysis. The algorithm 1 displays the
pseudocode of the procedure described above.
10The number of iterations is not binding, since the algorithm converges in seven thousand
iterations.
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Algorithm 1 Recovering Students’ Cardinal Preferences
1: Set probabilities of admission for each student: {ηs}Ss=1
2: Set initial preferences for each student: {u0s}Ss=1
3: Set aggregated assignments from actual data: {am}Mm=1
4: Set the maximum number of iterations N
5: Set the preference adjustment parameter δ > 0
6: Set optimal preference {u∗s}Ss=1 = {u0s}Ss=1
7: Set the initial error: 0 =∞
8: while j < N and j 6= 0 do
9: Apply MIA to obtain each student optimal portfolio: {m∗s,j}Ss=1
10: Run a serial dictatorship algorithm using {m∗s,j}Ss=1 as reports
11: Determine simulated assignments: {φs,j(m∗)}Ss=1
12: Compute the assignment error per major m,j = |∑Ss=1 1{φs,j(m∗) = m}−
am|
13: Compute the total assignment error: j =
∑M
m=1 m,j
14: if j < j−1 then
15: Set Optimal preferences u∗s ← us,j
16: end if
17: if m < 0 then
18: ums,j = ums,j−1 + δ if and only if the order in u0s is not violated
19: else if m > 0 then
20: ums,j = ums,j−1 − δ if and only if the order in u0s is not violated
21: end if
22: j ← j − 1
23: end while
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2.3.5 Initial Preferences: “Revealed Preference” Algorithm
We use the students’ reported preferences and the history of past threshold
scores to recover students preferences. I propose an algorithm to do so. One
assumption underlying the algorithm is that students’ preferences and scores are
independent.
To understand why independence is a natural assumption, note that the score
is determined partly by a grades in high school and partly by a standardized exam.
There is evidence that students are still forming their preferences over majors, at
the point where they are taking the admissions test. 11
To present our argument we suppose that students are allowed to report only
two majors, as it is the case in the UCR. We construct different tiers based on the
information of past threshold scores to categorize students into classes. Because
we have a series of past threshold scores instead of a single value, we take the t˜m
as the maximum of the past threshold scores in major m. We say that if a student
s has a score greater than the highest maximum threshold score, he belongs to the
first tier. Students in the first tier can “afford” any major. Students with scores
between the second highest and the highest maximum threshold score belong to
the second tier, and they can afford all the majors but the major with the highest
maximum threshold score. We classify all students into different tiers following
the same procedure.
Students in tier 1 are the students for which there is certainty to get admission
into any of the majors. Hence, for them it is a strictly dominant strategy to report
their most preferred option in the first position, and a weakly dominant strategy
11According to university authorities, many students attend the Center of Vocational Orien-
tation between September and November. The Center helps students discern their aptitudes
towards each major. They take the exam in September and they have to report their preferences
in November.
26
to report the truth in the second position. We use the reports of these students,
as the beginning of all the potential ordinal preferences that students can have.
By the assumption of preferences and scores, for any student s in tier 1 there
exist a student s˜ in tier 2 that shares the same preference profile. However, student
s˜ does not necessarily report the same ordered list as student s, because he has
lower priority, and so reporting less preferred colleges but with lower historical
threshold scores could be optimal. Nonetheless, we can use his report to complete
the report of student s, provided that two consistency conditions –namely, no
dominated choice and no cycles in preferences– are satisfied. We can proceed
recursively for the succeeding tiers in the same fashion.
Recall that for a any tier `, a report of student s in tier `, m`s, is an ordered
pair. Now, let o` be a preference profile constructed by using the students’ reports
up to tier `. That is, o` is formed by concatenating the selected reports in each of
the previous tiers, whenever it is “feasible”. Hence, the dimension of o` is weakly
increasing in the index of the tier.
The concatenation procedure works as follows. We pick a report m1 in tier
1 (we will avoid to write the identity of the student for simplicity, and instead
will use a superscript to keep track of the tier), and set it as the beginning of an
ordinal preference profile. That is, o1 = m1. Then, if the report m2 in tier 2 is a
“feasible” continuation of the profile o1, the new profile would be o2 = o1 ⊕m2,
where ⊕ stands for concatenation. In general, o` = o`−1 ⊕m` for ` ≥ 2.
The report m` is a feasible successor to the profile o`−1 if two conditions of
minimum rationality are satisfied: (i) no-dominated choice and (ii) no cycles.
Definition 2 (No-dominated choice). We say that a report m`s in tier ` satisfies
the no-dominated choice relative to the preference profile o`−1, if for all majors
reported in m`s there is not a major in o`−1 that is strictly preferred, and whose
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threshold score is lower than the student score xs.
In other words, it says that a student in tier ` will not choose to report a less
preferred major whenever a major in the profile o`−1 is “affordable.”
Definition 3 (No cycles). We say thatm` satisfies the no-cycles property relative
to the preference profile o`−1 if no major in o`−1 ⊕m` forms a cycle in the order
of preferences.
For a given report m` in tier `, we define the set of its antecessors, A(m`),
as the set of all profile preferences o`−1, for which it can be a feasible successor.
The set of feasible successors for a given preference profile o`−1 can be defined in
a similar manner.
The following example illustrates how the algorithm operates.
Example Suppose there are ten students and five majors: Medicine (M), Law
(L), Engineering (E), History (H) and Arts (A). Each major has exactly one seat
available. Students can be assigned at most one seat in each college. If a student
is not assigned a seat in any college, we say he is out college, and denote this
option by ∅.
Students are categorized in tiers, constructed from the historical maximum
scores, as follows:
M L E H A
800 710 685 615 590 515 442
τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 τ5 τ6
Figure 2.1: Definition of Tiers
Students’ information is summarized in table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Students’ Scores and Reports
Student Score Tier Report
1 750 1 (M,L)
2 735 1 (M,E)
3 705 2 (L,M)
4 690 2 (E,H)
5 650 3 (E,A)
6 620 3 (H,A)
7 600 4 (L,A)
8 570 5 (A,H)
9 550 5 (A,E)
10 525 5 (L,A)
By the procedure described above, the two reports in tier 1, (M,L) and (M,E),
are set as the commencement of the different preference profiles students can have.
The next step is to determine the feasible antecessors for each of the reports
in tier 2, which are,
A[(L,M)] = ∅ and A[(E,H)] = {(M,E)}
Notice that (M,L) cannot be a valid antecessor of (L,M) because it would form
a cycle in preferences. Likewise, (M,E) would violate the no-dominated choice
property, because the agent would be choosing to report L, as his first option,
while E is still affordable and is preferred. For the same reason (M,L) can not
be a valid antecessor of (E,H). Hence, the only possibility is to concatenate the
profile (M,E) with the report (E,H); to discard the report (L,M); and to carry
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over the profile (M,L) to the next tier. Thus, the preference profiles up to tier 2
would be (M,L) and (M,E,H)
Using the reports in tier 3 we have that
A[(E,A)] = {M,L} and A[(H,A)] = {(M,L), (M,E,H)}
Although the profile (M,L) is a feasible antecessor for both reports, we give
priority in the assignment of antecessors to the reports submitted by students with
higher score. Then, (M,L) is assigned to (E,A), and thus the only possibility is
to assign (M,E,H) to (H,A). Therefore, the preference profiles up to tier 3 would
be (M,E,H,A) and (M,L,E,A).
Continuing in the following fashion, we can show that the final ordinal prefer-
ence profiles would be (M,E,H,A) and (M,L,E,A,H). To utilize such profiles
in the general algorithm it is necessary to assign cardinal utilities to both profiles.
As an illustration, we assign a value of 2, 000 utils to the most preferred major in
each profile, and then decrease the intensity in 400 utils until reaching the last.
Notice that Law (L) is not ranked in the first profile, and so it can be assigned
any value lower than 400 and greater than 0. We assign it a value of 100. There-
fore, letting u = (uM , uL, uE, uH , uA) be the vector of cardinal utilities, we can
construct the following two vectors from the procedure above
u′ = (2, 000; 200; 1, 600; 1, 200; 800) and u′′ = (2, 000; 1, 600; 1, 200; 1, 200; 800; 400)
Finally, each student is assigned any of these profiles with equal probability,
and independently of their score.
In general, the algorithm to concatenate the reports across tiers is as follows.
We identify all the reports in tier 1 and set them as the commencement of the
different preference profiles students can have. Then, we sort the reports in tier
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2 in decreasing order with respect to students’ score, and determine the set of
feasible antecessors for each report. To continue, we pick the first report and
assign a preference profile randomly from the set of feasible antecessors. The new
preference profile is constructed by concatenating the chosen antecessor with the
current report.
We exclude the chosen antecessor from the set of antecessors of other reports,
and continue recursively for the rest of the profiles in tier 2. Finally, we repeat
the procedure for all tiers. If a profile cannot be continued by a report in tier `,
then it is carried over intact to the next iteration in tier `+1. Furthermore, if in a
particular tier `, there exist more reports than the potential profiles constructed up
to tier `− 1, we discard the reports that cannot be matched. This is fundamental
to maintain the number of profiles equal to the ones encountered in tier 1.
Once we determine the different ordinal profiles, we need to assign a cardinal
utility to them, so that they can be utilized as the initial preferences in the algo-
rithm described below. In order to do so, we define a vector of cardinal utilities
based on the position of each major in the profile. That is, we assign the maxi-
mal cardinal utility for the major in the first position, the second highest for the
second position, and so on. Clearly, each major in each profile will be attached a
different cardinal utility depending on the position it holds in the profile. Finally,
by the assumption of independence between preferences and profiles, we assign
the cardinal profile of preferences to each student uniformly random.
2.3.6 Evaluation of Equilibrium Assignments
To evaluate the different policies considered, we compare the resultant assign-
ments with the ones obtained when students are allowed to report preferences over
all the majors available. The reason to use the latter case as a benchmark lies in
31
the fact that it has three desirable properties: (i) it is a strategy-proof mechanism,
(ii) its final assignment is Pareto-optimal, and (iii) its final assignment is free of
justified envy.
We use three measures to capture the dissimilarity between the assignments of
the case under consideration and the benchmark. The first is the fraction of stu-
dents with a different assignment from the benchmark. The second is the euclidean
norm between the vectors of cardinal utilities associated to the assignments. The
third is the aggregate welfare obtained by adding the cardinal utility associated to
each student’s assignment. Here, the relevance is the direction of the effect more
on its magnitude, since it involves interpersonal comparisons of utilities that are
hard to interpret.
2.4 Data Overview
We have data from the admission process at UCR in 2008, which includes all
students who applied for admission. In particular. each student’s record contains
information such as: gender, age, high school of procedence, admission score,
majors reported as first and second option, and the final assignment given by the
admission algorithm.
Population There are three stages of the admission process at which students
can be identified: (i) those who take the test, (ii) those who take the test and
become eligible and (iii) those who become eligible and submit a report to the
RO. Our data set corresponds to the population at the second stage in 2008,
which corresponds to 19, 621 students. From these, 9, 930 -around 51%- did not
apply to any major. From 9, 691 students who applied to some major (i.e. those
who submit a report of preferences to the RO), 2, 470 of them -around 13%- did
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not get a seat in any major. It implies that 7, 221 students were assigned to some
major in one of the campuses around the country, and specifically, 5, 212 were
assigned to the main campus.
Academic offer The UCR counts with a central campus located in the capital,
and five branches around the country. The main campus offered eighty two majors
in 2008, which can be grouped in nine academic areas: (i) Arts, (ii) Literature,
(iii) Hard Sciences, (iv) Education, (v) Economic Sciences (vi) Social Sciences,
(vii) Engineering, (viii) Health, and (ix) Agro-alimentary Sciences. Some majors
(e.g. piano, composition, physics and pure mathematics) are offered exclusively by
UCR at the main campus. Although in recent years the UCR has made an effort
to augment the menu in peripheral campuses, the academic offer continues to be
restricted in comparison to the main campus, and historically has been designed
to fulfill a requirement of professionals in region-specific economic activities.
We consider the main campus as the “main target” for students who apply
to the UCR. In fact, from the 9, 691 students who applied for admission, 7, 584
listed a major in the main campus as their first option. This number increases
to 8, 219 if considered those who put a major in the main campus as the second
option. Moreover, given the different reasons introduced in section 2.1, for many
students the UCR constitute the only option of higher education in Costa Rica.
To support this assertion, table (4) shows the fraction of students who accepted
to be enrolled in their second option.
Threshold Scores We have access to the series of threshold scores for all majors
offered in the main campus for the period 2000-2014. Notice that if this informa-
tion is stable over time, it provides a student with a notion of what are his chances
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to get admission in a particular major, given his current score. We plot in figure
?? the series of past threshold for selected majors.
2.5 Simulation Results
In this section we discuss the main results of applying the methodology intro-
duced in section 2.3 to the data described in section 2.4.
First, we present the results of the auxiliary “revealed preference” algorithm
implemented to determine the initial preferences of the general algorithm. We
use the historical maximum score in each major to construct the different tiers,
whose distribution is presented in figure 7 in the appendix 4.4. As it can be
seen, there are 205 students in tier 1, whose reports are the first step to form the
different ordinal preference profiles. After applying the procedure explained in
section 2.3.5 to concatenate the reports, we obtain that the median length of the
preference profiles (i.e. the number of majors the algorithm is capable to order) is
42, whereas the maximum is 50 and the minimum is 35. The standard deviation
is 3.45. The reason for which it is not possible to order all majors within a profile
is because the two rationality conditions are binding. All majors that were not
ordered within a profile are considered the least preferred in such profile.
The next step is to assign the cardinal utilities to the ordinal profiles con-
structed. We assign 2075 utils to the most preferred major in each profile, and
then decrease 25 utils to the next option below, until assigning a cardinal utility to
the last major ranked in the profile. All majors that were not ranked by the profile
are given 5 utils. The way of assigning cardinal utilities is chosen by convenience,
however, the main insights that we obtain do not depend on it.
Given these preference profiles, and the admission probabilities obtained from
the data, we run our general algorithm to recover the cardinal preference profiles
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Figure 2.2: Assignment Error in the Baseline Model.
that rationalize the total assignments in each major. As such, we compute the
absolute and relative error. The former is the absolute difference between the
actual aggregate assignment and the simulated aggregate assignment in each ma-
jor. Likewise, the latter is computed as the absolute error divided by the total
of seats in each major. Following our two-step methodology, we find an absolute
error of 300 seats, and a relative error of approximately 6%. Figure 2.2 depicts
the difference between the simulated assignment and the actual assignment in the
data, for each of the 82 majors. As it can be seen the maximum absolute error
is bounded above by 32. Therefore, the algorithm not only shows a very good fit
in the aggregate, but also when considering each major separately. Meanwhile,
Figure 10 in appendix 4.4 shows the simulated threshold scores.
Robustness As a robustness check, we repeat the same exercise for different
specifications of the initial preferences, as presented in table 2.2. For instance, in
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Table 2.2: Results for Different Specification of Preferences
Specification Absolute Relative
Error Error
(1) All Profiles (205) 300 5.8%
(2) Truncated: 20 options 482 9.2%
(3) Random Profiles 1263 24.2%
(4) 80 profiles: First 415 7.8%
(5) 80 profiles: Random 633 12.1%
(6) 40 profiles: First 687 13.2%
(7) 40 profiles: Random 661 12.7%
Note: (1) All profiles obtained in the algorithm described in sec-
tion 2.3.5 are utilized. (2) The number of profiles is the same as
in (1) but they are truncated to the first 20 majors ranked. (3)
The number of profiles is the same as in (1), but majors within
each profiles are randomly ordered. (4,5) Only 80 profiles from
205 are considered, chosen as the first or randomly. (6,7) The
same procedure as in (4,5) but only for 40 profiles.
the second line we truncate all the 205 preference profiles to the first 20 majors
ordered. That is, we assume that the individual is only able to rank the first 20
majors in each profile, and is indifferent among the remaining.
Meanwhile, in the third line we keep the original 205 profiles, but permute
randomly the order within each profile. Notice that unlike the previous exercise
we keep the number of major each profile ranks.
In lines four to seven, we reduce the number of profiles to investigate how
sensible are the results when students are more homogeneous in their preferences.
Specifically, instead of using the complete 205 profiles, we only use a selection of
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them. In lines four and five we select 80 profiles, whereas in lines six and seven
we choose only 40 profiles. In both cases we use two criteria of selection: (i) using
the first profiles ranked, and (ii) choosing the profiles uniformly random.
As we can see, using all profiles delivers the best adjustment among all spec-
ifications, as well as it maximizes the welfare and the caliber of the students
admitted. On the other hand, using a random permutation in each of the original
profiles produces the highest absolute error and the lowest level of welfare and
innovation. We can observe that the lost in accuracy of passing from 205 profiles
to 80 is lower than passing from 80 to 40, since the degree of heterogeneity in pref-
erences is not sufficient to induce students to apply to all the majors. Moreover,
given a particular number of profiles, using the first profiles is better than choosing
them randomly. The explanation comes from the fact that the first reports are
those from students with the highest scores, and so they are the most reliable to
report truthfully.
Achieving a good fit of adjustment for the aggregated assignment with 205
has merit per se, because when the number of majors is 82, the total possible
orderings –including the option of truncating the list at any point– is given by the
expression
81∑
j=1
82!
(82− j)! = 8.37× 10
122
These expression counts all possible preference profiles when the length of each
profile varies. For example, when the index of the sum is equal to two, we are
counting how many ordered pairs can be constructed. Such case corresponds to
a situation when the student prefers to be out of college if he is not admitted to
their two first options reported. Proceeding analogously for all possible lengths of
the report, we get the number of all possible preference profiles students can have:
a gigantic number.
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2.6 Counterfactual Analysis
Once we recover the preferences that rationalize students’ choices from the
numerical simulation, the natural step is to conduct counterfactual exercises about
different admission policies. The results of these analyses are vital to understand
better how to organize the general admission process in order to produce more
efficient allocations. In practice, authorities normally do not count with tools to
conduct a rigorous study, and decision about policies are normally made, either
based on conjectures or by inferences of related “markets”.
With the theoretical and empirical tools developed in the previous sections
we can be precise over how to evaluate the different tradeoffs present in the im-
plemetation of different admission policies. In particular, we can evaluate what is
the gain of letting students to report more options, how to reallocate seats across
majors, or how to implement a second-best affirmative action program. Those are
topics under high scrutiny by policy makers.
2.6.1 Augmenting the Options to Report
The RO controls how many options each student can report, and this parameter
affects equilibrium allocations. Here, we evaluate to which extent the restriction
makes students to adopt a different strategy from truth-telling, and how it is
reflected in the final assignments.
Figure 2.3a shows that the fraction of students with different assignment from
the benchmark is decreasing in k, as expected. That is, as the number of op-
tions to report increases, students report closer to their true order of preferences.
Allowing students to report only two options implies that 72% of the students
have a different assignment from the benchmark. Likewise, figure 2.3b shows that
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Figure 2.3: Dissimilarity with respect to the Benchmark
the euclidean norm is also decreasing in k, which implies that the dissimilarity in
utilities is reduced as k approaches to the total of majors available.
We also investigate the effect to the aggregate welfare of increasing the number
of options. Here, there are two effects to consider. First, a higher number of
options k makes the students more aggressive in virtue of Proposition 1, and so
if they get into college they will be admitted in a weakly preferred major, which
increases their welfare. Second, augmenting k also has the effect of decreasing the
probability of admission of students with lower priority, which can be detrimental
for aggregated welfare. Such negative effect is magnified if the RO has some
consideration of affirmative action programs.
Restricting the number k also introduces more uncertainty in students’ decision
problem, and forces students with high priority to play protective strategies by
choosing options less desired but with higher probabilities of admission. At the
same time, it may increase the probabilities of admission for students with low
priority, which has the potential to increase welfare by the same argument as
before.
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Figure 2.4: Welfare and Innovation for Different Rearrangements Scenarios
Figure 2.4b depicts the fraction of winners and losers as k increases. A winner
[loser] is a student who is assigned a more [less] preferred major with respect to his
assignment in the original mechanism with k = 2 options. The intersting finding
here is that the difference between the fraction of winners and losers is obtained
around a value of k = 20.
Another measure of welfare we can utilize is the proportion of students assigned
to his most preferred option, which can be different from the first option reported.
Increasing k decreases the uncertainty over the admission process, and so induces
more students to report their first option truthfully, which a priori should increase
the number of students assigned to their most preferred option. Nonetheless, as
we can observe in Figure 9 the proportion of students assigned to their first major
remains very stable when varying the number of options to report.
2.6.2 Reallocation of Seats across Majors
In the admission process of 2008, several majors did not fill all the seats that
were available, whereas many others were highly over demanded. It happened
mostly in the college of arts where all of the 13 majors wasted some their capacity.
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This phenomenon has been persistent according to university authorities. Here,
we analyze what would be the impact on students’ welfare and caliber, if all wasted
seats were proportionally reallocated to: (i) the top 10 most demanded majors,
(ii) the top 5 most demanded majors, and (iii) the most demanded major, which
is medicine. 12 In the case of (i) and (ii) we use the ratio of each major’s demand
–defined as how many students place the major as their first option– to the total
demand within the correspondent group, as a weight to assign the extra seats.
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Figure 2.5: Welfare and Innovation for Different Rearrangements Scenarios
Figure 2.5 shows that the most effective policy in terms of welfare and inno-
vation is to redistribute the wasted seats in the top ten most-demanded majors.
Allocating all the seats in the most popular career, medicine, would not produce
a cascade effect, like the one commented above, which reflects the fact that pref-
erences exhibit a sufficient degree of variation.
12Proportions are computed as the number of students who lists a particular major in the first
position, with respect to the total of reports being considered. Then we renormalize the weights,
so they can add up to one.
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2.6.3 Affirmative Action Programs
Affirmative action in higher education refers to the aim of reaffirming the rights
of groups under-represented in the student body due to social, ethnic, gender
or economic reasons. There are many ways to implement an affirmative action
program, but in this section we will analyze two popular programs: (i) quotas (ii)
and a bonus over the admission score (i.e. a “subsidy” over the score obtained).
Students who come from high schools that have been historically under-represented
in enrollment constitute our target population. We use the list of high schools
provided by the RO to identify such students.
Quotas This program proposes to secure a predefined number of seats to the
target population. In that sense, students within the target group will compete
with their equals for a seat in a major. To implement this policy, the admission
process is carried over via two sequential serial dictatorship algorithms. In the
first, only students from the not favored population participate, and the number
of seats in each major corresponds to the predefined quota. Those students who
were not assigned in the first stage, will participate in a second serial dictatorship
mechanism over the remaining seats, along with those students who do not meet
the affirmative action condition. The assignments after this second stage are
considered final assignments.
Notice form panel 2.6c that when the quota is lower than 10%, the proportion
of targeted students admitted do not vary dramatically from the one obtained
when such affirmative action is absent. As soon as it gets higher than 10% the
fraction starts to increase sharply. However, notice that it is always under the
quota reserved. For instance, notice that when the quota reserved is 20% of the
spaces, the fraction admitted is lower than 20%. It happens because, although
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Figure 2.6: Counterfactual Analysis for a System of Quotas
with a quota all target students only compete with their equals for a seat, there
still some majors that are over-demanded, and hence some students do not get
admission in any of the two majors reported to the RO. Students that are not
assigned in the first stage are hardly assigned in the second stage, since now they
have to compete with all regular students who have higher scores.
Figures 2.6a and 2.6b show the distortive effect of introducing the quotas. The
first computes how the introduction of different quota levels affect the fraction
of students that receive a different assignment from the benchmark. The second
computes the respective euclidean norm. Both graphs are u-shape. It suggests
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that some students from the target population who have high score, are choosing
very popular majors when given two options. When the RO starts using the
quota, they are admitted at the major they would have been admitted if given the
possibility to report the full list. When the quota start to increase beyond 10%,
students who would not be admitted under the full list, are now admitted because
the quota is sufficiently high. The similar intuition holds for the euclidean norm.
Bonus in the Admission Score The second program intends to give a bonus
α in the admission score to all students from the target population, to later run a
serial dictatorship mechanism over the adjusted scores. Specifically, if a student
from the not favored population has a score of xs points, his adjusted admission
score would be (1 + α)xs. A similar exercise is analyzed in Chade et. al. (2014),
when each college “discounts” the standard requested to admit a student from the
target population.
Unlike the quota, the bonus scheme in panel 2.7c produces an immediate effect
in increasing the admission of students from the target population. The explana-
tion is that students who have the benefit of the bonus become more competitive
with respect to all regular students. In particular, notice that when the planner
uses a quota, the less competitive students from the target population are likely
to lose their seat with their more competitive equals, and even more likely with
the students from the regular population. Nonetheless, when the planner uses a
bonus, those candidates become stronger and capable to compete with the less
competitive students from the regular population for a seat. This effect makes
that the proportion of students admitted be higher when using a bonus scheme
relative to a quota.
With respect to the distortive effect of the bonus, we can see in figures 2.7a
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Figure 2.7: Counterfactual Analysis for a Bonus System
and 2.7b that the bonus is more distortive than the quota, if the target of the RO
is admitting a high fraction of the students from the target population.
2.7 Alternate Mechanisms
Alternatively to the use of an admission algorithm, where the student faces
uncertainty over his possibilities to get admission in each major, the RO can
use procedures where the threshold required to be admitted in each major are
announced before students’ make their decision. Here, we investigate two different
mechanisms: the Posting Scores Upfront (PSU) and the Ascending Auction (AA)
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mechanisms.
2.7.1 Posting Scores Upfront (PSU)
The PSU is a mechanism akin to competitive equilibrium where the RO an-
nounces upfront the vector of threshold scores necessary to be admitted into a
major, t = (t1, · · · , tM); and commit to give a seat to every student who demands
a seat in a particular major, and has a score greater than the posted score. Un-
der this procedure, students observe posted scores, compute their set of feasible
majors, and choose the best option within this set according to their true prefer-
ences. Unlike the matching mechanism, in the PSU mechanism a student knows
ex-ante which majors are feasible, and hence, there is no uncertainty involved in
his decision problem. All the uncertainty is transferred to the planner, whose
decision problem becomes more cumbersome –since now it is the agent that has
to form beliefs about students’ preferences– whereas student’s decision problem is
simplified dramatically. The relevance of this trade-off should not be overlooked,
because normally it is argued that the objective of the RO is to maximize stu-
dents’ welfare. Hence, using a mechanism where students face the highest level of
uncertainty could be contradictory.
Students’ Decision Problem Once a vector of scores t is announced by the
RO, and admission scores are realized, the decision problem of student s consists
of picking a maximal element with respect to his preferences, in the set of feasible
majors. That is,
V (us, xs, t) = max
m∈{M(xs,t)∪{∅}}
ums (2.3)
where M(x, t) = {m ∈ M : x ≥ tm} is precisely the set of feasible majors. We
denote ψs(us, xs, t) the arg max of V (us, xs, t), and let
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Ψm(u,x, t) =
(
S∑
s=1
1(ψs(us, xs, t) = m)
)
be the aggregate demand for major m.
Remark 1 (Law of demand). Let t and t˜ be two posted admission scores vectors
such that t ≤ t˜. If t` = t˜` for all ` 6= m and tm < t˜m, then Ψm(u,x, t) ≥
Ψm(u,x, t˜). That is, ceteris paribus if the posted score of major m increases its
demand cannot increase.
Notice that since students have single-unit demands there are no wealth effects
in their decision problem. Moreover, for a given student s all majors but his most
preferred can be considered as inferior goods. That is, ψs(us, x˜s, t) s ψs(us, xs, t)
for all x˜s ≥ xs.
The RO’s problem in the PSU mechanism The RO can have different
objectives at the time of designing an admission policy. One of this could be
the maximization of students’ aggregate welfare (i.e. the sum of the cardinal
utilities associated to each student’s assignment). In that sense the RO would
be a benevolent planner that only cares about students well being. Alternatively,
the RO could be interested in maximizing the caliber of the students admitted
(i.e. maximizing the sum of the test score of the students admitted) under the
assumption that better students produce higher innovation in any major. Such
innovation produces spillovers to the rest of the economy, and then it as way to
retribute tax payers for financing public education.
Therefore, the maximization problem of the RO resides in choosing the vector
of admission scores t to maximize the predefined objective function, subject to a
capacity constraint. Let u = (u1, · · · ,uS) ∈ US be a profile of preferences, which
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are drawn according to the density f , and let x = (x1, · · · , xS) ∈ [x, xM ] be a
profile of scores. Then, the problem of the RO is given by
max
t∈[x,x]M
∫
US
(
S∑
s=1
γ[uψs(us,xs,t)s ] + (1− γ)[xs · 1{ψ∗s(us, xs, t) 6= ∅}]
)
f(u)du (2.4)
subject to
Ψm(u,x, t) ≤ qm ∀m ∀u (2.5)
where γ ∈ {0, 1}. When γ = 1 the RO maximizes the aggregate welfare,
whereas when γ = 0 it maximizes the aggregate caliber.
Condition 2.5 establishes that threshold scores have to be such that for any
major, and any realization of the preferences, the aggregate demand is lower than
or equal the number of seats in each major.
Now, suppose that the planner has the ability to create new seats in each
major m at a cost cm, and that he has a budget of B. Then, letting zm(u,x, t) =
max{Ψm(u,x, t)−qm, 0} be the excess demand in majorm, planner’s optimization
problem can be reconsidered as to maximize the objective in 2.4 subject to the
budget constraint,
M∑
m=1
zm(u,x, t)cm ≤ B ∀u (2.6)
Definition 4. The allocation ψ∗ = (ψ∗1, · · · , ψ∗S) and vector of threshold scores
t∗ = (t∗1, · · · , t∗M) constitutes an equilibrium of the posting admission mechanism
if
i) Given threshold scores t∗, ψ∗s solves student’s s decision problem, for each s.
ii) Given students’ demands ψ∗, threshold scores t∗ solves the RO’s decision
problem, subject to the capacity constraint (2.5), or the budget constraint
(2.6).
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The option of establishing threshold akin to a competitive market seems very
appealing for three reasons (i) students’ problem is reduced to choose the best
option out of a finite set of feasible majors, (ii) demands are expressed simultane-
ously and (iii) infra-marginal points of the test are valuable, because the points
earned in the test act like a budget constraint.
Simulating the PSU Mechanism Using the past threshold scores in each ma-
jor, we simulate the equilibrium assignments under the PSU mechanism, for three
different announcements of the threshold scores in each major: (i) the historical
mean, (ii) the historical median, and (iii) the historical maximum. Figure 11 shows
the excess demand per major, for the three scenarios considered before. As we
can see, there are large excess demand in many majors, which suggests that none
of these configuration constitute an equilibrium for the –degenerate case– when
preferences are equal to the ones recovered in the previous section. We provide an
algorithm to compute clearing market threshold scores in the next section.
2.7.2 Ascending Auction Mechanism
The main advantage of the PSU is that it removes completely the uncertainty
from students’ decision problem, but the planner needs to guarantee that either
the capacity constraint (2.5), or the (2.6) has to be satisfied. This restriction may
induce the planner to set thresholds scores conservatively high, which can reduce
students’ welfare.
An alternative to the PSU is to use an Ascending Auction mechanism (AA).
Here, the planner sets an initial asking threshold for getting a seat in a given
major, and students determine their optimal demand given their score and the
asking thresholds. Once individual demands are submitted, the planner computes
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the aggregated demand in each major, and adjusts upward the asking price for
a major with maximal demand. If there is more than one major with maximal
demand, a major is selected randomly. Once thresholds are adjusted, students
recompute their optimal demand. This process continues until no major has an
excess of demand. This mechanism retains the advantage of removing students’
uncertainty, but guarantees that the aggregated demand never exceeds the supply.
Our procedure resembles closely the algorithm introduced by Demange et al.
Proposition 2. For a given vector of scores x and preferences u, there exists an
equilibrium of the AA mechanism t∗ = (t∗1, · · · , t∗M).
Proof. Fix a profile of cardinal utilities u = (u1, · · · ,uS), and a profile of scores x.
Let the initial vector of scores be t0 = (t01 · · · , t0M) = (x, · · · , x). That is, the RO
the initial asking price is equal to the lowest score in all of the majors. Given this
information, it is possible to compute the excess demand function zm(u,x, t0).
Once the excess demand functions are computed for each major, a major with
maximal excess demand is selected from the set,
Z(u,x, t0) := {m ∈M : zm(u,x, t0) ≥ zm¯(u,x, t0) > 0 ∀m¯ ∈M}
and its score is adjusted by an  > 0 sufficiently small. Therefore, in the step `+1,
t`+1 = (t`1, · · · , t`m˜) + , · · · , t`M), where m˜ ∈ Z(u,x, t`).
Formally, fix 0 <  < min{|xs − xs˜| : s 6= s˜ ∈ S} and define the operator
ξ : [x, x]M × US 7→ [x, x]M by
ξ(t,u) = {y ∈ [x, x]M : ym = tm+ for m ∈ Z(u,x, t), and y` = t` for all ` 6= m}
Notice that [x, x]M is a complete lattice and ξ(·,u) is an isotone operator with
respect to the natural order in Rn. Then, by Tarki’s fixed point theorem, there
exists t ∈ ξ(t,u). Moreover, ξ(t,u) is a complete lattice, and then we can see
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that ∧ξ(·,u) and ∨ξ(·,u) are the lowest and largest equilibrium, respectively.
Let zm(u,x, t) be the excess demand in major m, and let Z(u,x, t) be the
set of majors with maximal demand. The algorithm 2 displays the pseudocode to
find the equilibrium threshold and assignments.
Simulating the AA Equilibrium We use the 205 preference profiles recovered
from the matching model to simulate the alternative AA mechanism. Once we
obtain the new assignments we compare them with the full-list benchmark. The
main finding is that only 5% of the students receive a different assignment under
the auction than under the matching model when students can report the full list.
We can observe whether equilibrium scores produced by the PSU mechanism
are higher than the endogenous scores obtained by the matching algorithm. Figure
12 depicts the equilibrium threshold scores in the AA and shows for all the unpop-
ular majors the PSU determines a higher threshold score, whereas for the most
popular it produces slightly lower threshold scores, which reflects the distortions
introduced by increasing the uncertainty in students’ decision process.
2.8 Conclusions
We study a major assignment problem where students report preferences over
majors the Register Office (RO), and assignments are determined based on stu-
dents’ priorities and reports, via a serial dictatorship mechanism. Preferences and
priorities are private information, and students are allowed to report fewer options
than the total of majors available. Hence, the admission mechanism is manipula-
ble, in the sense that reporting true preferences is not a weakly dominant strategy
for every student. Under this environment we propose a tractable methodology
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Algorithm 2 Finding Equilibrium Scores in the AA Mechanism
1: Set initial threshold scores: t0m = x for all m
2: Set students’ preferences: {us}Ss=1
3: Set students’ scores in the test: {xs}Ss=1
4: Set the adjustment factor of the threshold  > 0
5: Set the maximum number of adjustment steps N
6: while j < N and Z(u,x, tj) 6= ∅ do
7: Obtain students’ demand {ψs(us, xs, tj)}Ss=1
8: Compute aggregated demand in each major {Ψm(u,x, tj)}Ss=1}Mm=1
9: Compute excess demand function in each major {zm(u,x, tj))}Mm=1
10: Construct the set of majors with maximal excess demand: Z(u,x, tj)
11: Select randomly a major m from Z(u,x, tj)
12: Adjust the threshold score: tjm = (1 + )tj−1m
13: end while
14: j ← j − 1
for conducting several counterfactual analyses, without imposing truth-telling as
an equilibrium.
We depart from a game theoretic approach, and propose a multi-agent decision
approach, in which, given their cardinal utilities and admission probabilities, each
student has to choose which majors to report in order to maximize their expected
utility. Here, each student combines the history of past threshold scores with
their own score, to obtain their conditional vector of admission probabilities. Past
threshold scores are publicized by the RO, and let students to draw inferences
about the preferences and priorities of other students in a robust way.
Following this approach, we calibrate students’ preferences to match the ag-
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gregated assignments per major. That is, for a given vector of probabilities and
cardinal utilities for each student, we solve their decision problem. Then we run
the serial dictatorship mechanism and confront the simulated data with the actual
assignment. If the simulated assignment is higher [lower] than the current assign-
ment, we decrease [increase] the cardinal utility of this major in each profile of
preferences. We proceed recursively until fitting exactly the data or convergence
is reached.
Given that the computation is sensitive to the choice of the initial preferences,
we use a “revealed preference” algorithm to recover the initial ordinal profiles.
The key assumption in the procedure is the independence between scores and
preferences. In addition, we impose two minimal consistency conditions to con-
struct the profiles, namely, that students do not choose dominated options when
a better option is available, and that profiles do not form cycles in preferences.
Using this procedure, we recover 205 preference profiles and fit the data with an
error of approximately 6% (around 300 seats). This finding has merit, because the
number of preference profiles that students can have is of the order of 10122. We
check the robustness of our finding for different configuration of the preferences.
In all cases, the fitness to the data is significantly worse.
We consider that using a calibration in a major assignment problem is more
reasonable than estimating a random utility model, which is standard in the recent
empirical literature that tries to recover underlying preferences in school assign-
ment problems. The reason is that students’ cardinal preferences over majors are
mostly idiosyncratic, and it is difficult to obtain data over the covariates that
could affect students’ decisions. Furthermore, priorities are derived from the score
in a test, and are not related with the residence of the student, which does not
make possible to use location as a shifter regressor to identify preferences.
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Once we recover students’ preferences we conduct several counterfactual anal-
yses. First, we find that when students are allowed to report only two options,
72% percent of the students receive a different allocation from what they would
have gotten in the absence of constraints. Second, we find that redistributing the
wasted seats among the ten majors more demanded is better than a more concen-
trated policy of transferring all the seats to the most demanded major. Third, we
find that a bonus scheme –where students from the target population are given
a relative bonus in their admission score– is more effective. Nonetheless, it pro-
duces a higher distortion, with respect to the benchmark, in the overall population
assignment.
Finally, we propose two alternative mechanisms that eliminate students’ uncer-
tainty. In the first, the RO posts upfront the threshold scores to be admitted into
each major, and each student chooses the best option within their set of feasible
majors. In the second, the RO uses an ascending auction. Using the preferences
recovered in the matching mechanism, we show that the ascending auction pro-
duces an assignment where only 5% of the students receive a different major from
the case without constraints.
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Chapter 3
ON THE OPTIMALITY OF CONSTRAINED CHOICE IN COLLEGE
ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS
In many countries around the world the admission process to public universities
is organized through a centralized mechanism that places students into colleges,
taking into account students’ preferences over colleges and their scores in an ad-
mission test. A recurrent feature in such mechanisms is to let students to report
fewer options than the total of colleges available, or in other words, to constrain
students’ choice. Nonetheless, the intensity of the constraint varies from country
to country. For instance, in Turkey and Chile students can report, respectively,
up to thirty and ten options; whereas in other countries like in Costa Rica and the
Netherlands they are allowed to report, respectively, as few as two and one op-
tions. Furthermore, in some cases like Hungary students can report three options
but have to pay a fee starting the fourth reported option.
Despite of the burden a constrained choice imposes on students, as we will
see later, it happens to be the rule rather than the exception in the design of
admission mechanisms to public universities. One potential explanation for its
pervasiveness could be the higher computational cost it demands. However, given
the fact that universities count with modern computational resources to process
all the relevant information, the marginal cost of increasing the quota bestowed
to students would be negligible.
This series of observations open the question of why univerity authorities would
be interested in constraining the number of options students can report. In this
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article we provide a rationale for this behavior, assuming that there is a planner
(the Registrar Office) that has preferences over students’ allocations, expressed
through the innovation they can produce in their colleges assigned. Here, the
innovation students produce can be conceived as the outcome of the research
projects they undertake while enrolled at the university. Reasonably enough, we
assume it is an increasing function of students’ cognitive ability.
The reason of why a planner might care of this measure lies in the social
role that public universities are meant to play in many countries. Actually, in the
discussion between public universities and government authorities when bargaining
about how to finance higher education institutions, it is mentioned frequently that
one responsibility of public universities shall be the production of public goods to
retribute to the society part of the cost incurred by taxpayers. 1 Precisely, one
of such public goods is the production of the “innovation” realized through the
projects that students undertake as part of their research programs. These projects
produce spillovers to the rest of the economy but are normally “managed” by
public universities under a no-seeking-rents policy. However, not all the innovation
is equally valued by the planner. In fact, there could be strategic areas that
the planner may want to incentivize because they have a high potential (e.g.
nanotechnology, nuclear physics and computer science), whereas there are other
(e.g. law and medicine) it may want to de-incentivize due to congestion.
The intuition of why constraining the choice may benefit the planner to max-
imize the expected innovation produced is as follows. Suppose students are risk
averse and their preferences over colleges are private information. Moreover, as-
sume that planner’s preferences over colleges are completely misaligned with re-
1This retribution is more relevant in countries where public universities have bigger enroll-
ment, higher quality and where students of higher income are overrepresented, and so the low-
income taxpayers, subsidizes the upper tail of the income distribution.
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spect to students’ preferences, in the sense that the most preferred college by the
students is the least preferred by the planner, the second most preferred college
by students is the second least preferred by the planner, and so on. If the planner
lets students to report the full list, they have an incentive to report their true
preferences, which implies that in equilibrium the students with the highest scores
will be seated in their most preferred colleges, but in the least preferred from the
planner’s perspective. If the planner constrains the choice, it introduces a higher
risk, since the probability of being out of college increases. Under this scenario,
students would report their less preferred, yet safer colleges, since they are risk
averse. Hence, from planner’s perspective, the probability to seat the best students
in more preferred colleges increases with respect to the unconstrained case.
As an illustration, suppose all students prefer medicine to engineering, and
in turn engineering to physics, but the planner values more the innovation pro-
duced in physics to engineering to medicine, perhaps because there is congestion
in medicine and there are promising projects in physics that could boost the eco-
nomic growth of the country. Thus, in the first best the planner would like to
assign the best students to physics, the second set of students to engineering and
the third set of students to medicine. However, it cannot be done if students are
given the possibility to list all the possible colleges and priorities and preferences
have to be respected in the assignment process. Nonetheless, given that students
are risk averse and preferences are private, by constraining the choice the planner
makes that, more often, better students choose physics over medicine to secure a
seat in the university. In other words, it induces students to choose colleges that
are more aligned with its preferences.
The latter mechanism seems reasonable, since public universities are crucial
agents in the development of a country, and can use admission policies to induce
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allocations that seat the best students in strategic colleges. However, this approach
differs from standard matching literature, which implicitly assumes that the agent
that organizes the market is totally indifferent with respect to final assignments;
and limits its role to set the “right” institutions to guarantee that the induced
equilibrium allocations satisfy properties such as strategy-proofness and stability.
However, this dictum is frequently violated, since most of the universities use
a serial dictatorship mechanism, which is not strategy-proof when students are
constrained in the number of options to report (c.f. Haeringer and Klijn). This
feature demands from students to increase the sophistication of their strategic
thinking in order to maximize the value of their final assignment.
The fact that constraining choice destroys strategy-proofness is not irrelevant.
Indeed, strategy-proofness is normally considered as a desired property in any
admission mechanism, to the point that sometimes designers recommend to give up
other desirable properties like stability and Pareto-efficiency in order to guarantee
its existence. 2 Therefore, it would be difficult to justify the use of a constrained
mechanism on the light of standard matching literature.
Finally, it is important to remark that we do not pursue an optimal mechanism
approach in this paper. Our endeavor is more humble, since we do not evaluate
all possible admission mechanisms to determine which is the one that maximizes
preferences over students’ innovation. Instead, we fix the serial dictatorship mech-
anism, which is ubiquitous in the centralized admission systems around the world,
and try to find the conditions such that, relative to the objective of maximizing
planner’s preference over innovation, giving the students the opportunity to report
2For instance, the admission system used in the school public system of Boston, called the
Boston mechanism, was changed in favor of the Deferred Acceptance, under the idea that a
strategy-proof algorithm tends to minimize the “damage” produced on decision-takers that do
not strategize so well.
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the full list is suboptimal.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the literature of college-school as-
signment problems initiated by Balinski and Sönmez (1999), and Abdulkadiroğlu
and Sönmez (2003). They introduced a mechanism design approach to formalize
the admission process to public schools and public universities, in an environ-
ment where students’ preferences and priorities are common knowledge. Their
model has been known as the canonical school choice model, and later endeavors
have been centered in validating its equilibrium properties under different set of
assumptions. Nonetheless, and despite of its importance and recurrence, few pa-
pers have been interested in analyzing the implications of constraining students’
choice. From those that occupy on this, Haeringer and Klijn (2009) analyze the
implications for strategy-proofness and stability under the Deferred Acceptance
and Boston Mechanism when preferences and priorities are public. Meanwhile,
Casalmiglia, Haeringer and Klijn (2010) test the robustness of the constrained
choice in the laboratory. They find that when the admission mechanism is the
Deferred Acceptance, the proportion of individuals that behave rationally aug-
ments with the constraint, since the problem is more complex and students tend
to think harder to understand the mechanism.
Our paper also contributes to the matching literature that considers private
preferences and solve the induced Bayesian game, as in Abdulkadiroğlu, Che and
Yasuda (2011) and Troyan, (2012). However, these papers assume that students
coincide in the ranking of the schools, and only differ in the level of cardinal
utility each college yields, whereas in our case, students differ in the way they
rank colleges. We believe this is an important assumption, since in a college choice
-rather than in a school choice- problem preferences are mostly idiosyncratic.
Furthermore, we assume students are risk averse expected utility maximizers.
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A feature normally considered in insurance and auctions literature, but generally
disregarded in the college choice literature. A related paper in this matter is
Klijn et al. (2013) who study how constraining the choice affects equilibrium
properties through the indirect effect caused by students’ risk aversion. They
show in the laboratory that more risk averse individuals are more likely to play a
protective strategy (i.e. report a school less preferred but with a higher probability
of admission) under the Deferred Acceptance than under Boston Mechanism. In
our model students’ incentive to play a safe strategy is precisely the key element
that make useful the restriction of the number of options to the planner.
Organization of the Paper The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 illustrates the main insights of the problem at hand through a detailed
example. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 presents the main result of
the paper, under an assumption on preferences. Section 5 constructs a class of
preferences that endogeneizes such assumption. Section 6 concludes.
3.1 A Motivating Example
In this section we develop a detailed example that illustrates how restricting
the number of options can help the Registrar Office -RO hereafter- to maximize
its preferences over students’ assignments.
We assume there are four students indexed by 1, 2, 3, 4, and four colleges named
X, Y,W,Z. Each college has exactly one seat available. Students can be assigned
at most one seat in each college. If the student is not assigned a seat in any college,
we say he is out college, and denote this option by ∅.
Students are prioritized by the RO with respect to their score in an admission
test. Without loss of generality, we assume their priority is decreasing in their
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index. Specifically, the vector x = (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3) represents
their score in the test.
Own preferences over colleges are known by each student, but the preferences
of other students are private information. Nonetheless, it is common knowledge
that they are drawn, identically and independently, from the set V = {v′ =
(1, 0.9, 0.6, 0.3), v′′ = (0.6, 0.9, 1, 0.3)}, according to the probabilities: Pr(v =
v′) = 3/4 and Pr(v = v′′) = 1/4. Notice for example, that in v′, X is preferred
to Y , but in v′′, Y is preferred to X. Students’ utility over the college assigned c
is given by a constant relative risk aversion, von Neumann-Morgenstern function
u(c, v, ρ) = v1−ρc /(1 − ρ) , uc. Here, ρ corresponds to students’ risk aversion
parameter, which is also common knowledge, and we assume is equal to 0.7.
We suppose the RO uses a serial dictatorship mechanism to determine final
allocations based on the reports provided by the students. The description of the
algorithm is as follows:
In step 1. The student with the highest score is considered. He is assigned a
seat at the major reported in the first position.
In step 2. The student with second highest score is considered. He is assigned
a seat at the major reported in the first position if there are available seats;
otherwise, he is assigned a seat at the major reported in the second position.
In step ` (` > 2). The student with the `th highest score is considered. He is as-
signed a seat at the major reported in the highest position that has available seats.
A relevant observation is that, as the students are given fewer options to report,
the uncertainty over final assignments increase.
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Given the latter environment, we analyze how equilibrium assignments change
when students are not allowed to report the full list, but instead are constrained
in their choice. 3
When students are entitled to report the full list, it is a well-known result in
the literature that a serial dictatorship mechanism is strategy-proof (c.f. Dubins
and Freeman, 1981; and Roth, 1982). Therefore, equilibrium assignments depend
solely on the realization of preferences.
Denote µ a matching between students and colleges. Thus, the ex-ante dis-
tribution of equilibrium assignments when students are entitled to report four
colleges, corresponds to
Pr(µ(1) = (X, Y,W,Z)) = 9/16 (3.1)
Pr(µ(2) = (X,W, Y, Z)) = 3/16
Pr(µ(3) = (W,X, Y, Z)) = 3/16
Pr(µ(4) = (W,Y,X,Z)) = 1/16
First, notice that when students are allowed to report the full list, a student
with priority `th will receive at least his `th preferred college in any equilibrium.
The first term in (3.1) corresponds to the case where students 1 and 2 draw the
preference profile v′. By independence, this event occurs with probability 9/16.
Now, because the assignment algorithm is a serial dictatorship, and all students
report truthfully, student 1 gets his most preferred college, in this case college X,
whereas the student 2 gets his second choice, college Y . Student 3 gets college W ,
independently of his preference profile; because W is strictly preferred than Z in
both profiles. Likewise, the second term in (3.1) corresponds to the case where
3For the rest of the example we will focus in the case of weakly undominated strategies to
analyze the respective equilibria of the admission game.
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student 1 draws the preference profile v′ and student 2 draws the profile v′′. The
probability of this event is 3/16. Here, since preferences of both students do not
coincide, both get their best option, college X in the case of student 1, and college
W in the case of student 2. It immediately secures a seat in college Y to student
3, independently of his preference profile, because Y is strictly preferred to Z. We
can recover the other two terms following the same analysis.
Suppose now that the RO allows students to report only two options. Students
1 and 2 continue to report truthfully, because their priority is greater than or equal
to the number of options to report, and so there will be a seat available for them
in some of these colleges with certainty. Students affected by the restriction are
students 3 and 4, who now do not have a trivial best response.
Denote by σ∗s(s, vs) the optimal pure strategy of student s when his type is vs,
and ηs(σ∗−s) = (ηs(X, σ∗−s), · · · , ηs(Z, σ∗−s)) as his vector of admission probabilities;
given that other students are following the profile of equilibrium strategies σ∗−s.
Using the information over the distribution of preferences for students 1 and
2, we have that
η3(σ∗−3) = (1/16, 3/8, 9/16, 1)
Hence, we can convert the problem of finding the optimal response of student 3
into an individual decision problem in which, given his preferences and vector of
admission probabilities, he finds the combination of colleges that maximizes his
expected utility. In this case,
σ∗3(3, v′) = (Y, Z); σ∗3(3, v′′) = (W,Z)
That is, student 3 protects himself incorporating college Z in their “optimal port-
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folio” when he has only two options to report. Recall that under the full list case,
college Z was never reported among the first two options by student 3.
Taking into account the best response of student 3, it is possible to proceed in
the similar fashion for student 4. His corresponding vector of admission probabil-
ities would be
η4(σ∗−4) = (1/16, 6/64, 27/64, 27/64)
Notice that since student 3 is now moving college Z up in his report, the
probability of student 4 to get admission there reduces to 27/64.
Now, his optimal response corresponds to
σ∗4(4, v′) = σ∗4(4, v′′) = (W,Z)
which implies he reports the two colleges with the highest probability of admission.
In summary, the ex-ante distribution over equilibrium outcomes when students
can report only two options is given by
Pr(µ(1) = (X, Y,W,Z)) = 9/64 (3.2)
Pr(µ(2) = (X, Y, Z,W )) = 27/64
Pr(µ(3) = (X,W, Y, Z)) = 3/64
Pr(µ(4) = (X,W,Z, ∅)) = 9/64
Pr(µ(5) = (W,X, Y, Z)) = 9/64
Pr(µ(6) = (W,X,Z, ∅)) = 3/64
Pr(µ(7) = (W,Y, Z, ∅)) = 1/16
Observe that under the restriction, students 1 and 2 will be given the same ex-
ante probability to receive colleges X, Y and W as in the full list case. However,
student 3, who is never assigned to college Z under the full list case, has now a
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probability of 5/8 of being assigned there under the constrained choice. Likewise,
student 4, who always –and only– gets a seat in college Z under the full list case,
has now a probability of 27/64 of being assigned college W , and a probability 1/4
of being out of college.
Suppose further that the RO has preferences over the assignment of students.
In particular, suppose it would like to seat the best student in college Z, the
second best in college W , and so on, until seating the worst student in college X.
Hence, ceteris paribus, the RO would be better off if it can switch assignments of
two students, so that a better student get a seat in a more preferred college from
its perspective.
In fact, by comparing the distribution of matchings under both scenarios, we
can see that µ(1) and µ(2) in (3.2) corresponds to µ(1) in (3.1). However, in the
second matching of the constrained case, students 3 and 4 switch positions, placing
the student with higher score in a more preferred college by the RO. Likewise,
matchings µ(3) and µ(4) in (3.2) correspond to µ(2) in (3.1). Here, in the second
matching, student 3 is switched to college Z but at the expense of wasting a seat
in college Y . The analysis is the same for the rest of the assignments.
Notice that, if the differences in the RO’s cardinal preferences over the assign-
ment of students are sufficiently big, the RO would be better off by restricting
students’ choice even at the expense of wasting a seat in one of the colleges.
Although a planner would rarely have preferences for students assignments
per se, it is reasonable to assume that it has preferences over an indirect measure.
Here, we consider the RO has the objective to maximize the aggregated innovation
a student produce when he is seated in a given college c. Specifically, we assume
that a student s assigned to college c will produce ξcxαs units of innovation for
the planner, where ξ = (ξX , ξY , ξW , ξZ) = (0.2, 0.6, 1, 1.8) represents the RO’s
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preferences. The parameter α is set equal to 0.5. As introduced before, the way
the RO ranks the colleges is inversely related with the most probable preference
type in the support of students’ preferences.
Using the information provided by (3.1) and (3.2), and given the functional
form of the innovation measure, it is possible to see that the RO would be better
off by constraining the choice to two options. In this case, the expected aggregated
innovation would be 2.47, which is higher than 2.28, the one obtained in the full
list case. In fact, it can be shown that allowing students to report two options, is
the level of the restriction that maximizes the RO’s objective.
3.2 The Model
Students, Colleges. A student-college assignment problem consists of a finite set
of colleges C = {1, 2, · · · ,M}, each with one seat available, and a finite set of
students, S = {1, 2, · · · , N}. We assume that M ≤ N , and thus that, at most,
there are many slots to accommodate exactly all students into a college. The
outside option of students who do not attend college is denoted by ∅.
Scores. Students are prioritized by the score they obtained in a standardized test.
The vector x denotes the list of scores obtained by students in such admission test,
which belongs to the set X , {x = (x1, · · · , xN) ∈ RN++ : xs 6= x` for all s 6= `}.
That is, any profile of scores induces a unique priority order in the admission
process. We assume scores are public information to all agents. Moreover, without
loss of generality, we sort students in decreasing order with respect to their score.
Thus, xs > x` if and only if s < `. Under this convention, the index of each
student determines his priority, and so a student s has a priority higher than or
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equal to K if s ≤ K. 4
Students’ Preferences. Students’ preferences over colleges in C are represented by
a vector of cardinal utilities, vs, that belongs to set V , {v′ = (v1′, · · · vM ′), v′′ =
(v1′′, · · · vM ′′) ∈ [v, v]M : vc 6= v` for all c 6= `}. We assume that the utility of the
outside option, v∅, is equal to zero for all students. We write o`(v) to denote the
`th preferred college, according to v. Without loss of generality, we assume that
oc(v′) = c for all c ∈ C. In that sense, under the profile v′, c has a higher cardinal
utility than c˜, if and only if c < c˜.
Different colleges are ranked according to the utility function u(·, ρ) : C ×
V → R, where ρ represents student’s uniform level of risk aversion. A profile of
preferences is denoted by V = (v1, · · · , vN) ∈ VN . Likewise, for all V ∈ VN , V−s ≡
(v1, · · · , vs−1, vs+1, · · · , vN) denotes the projection of V over VS\{s}. We assume
that each student’s preference vs is private information, and drawn identically and
independently with probabilities Prs(v′) = p ∈ (0, 1) and Prs(v′′) = 1− p. Hence,
Pr(V ) = ∏Ns=1 Prs(vs) denotes the probability of drawing a profile of preferences
V .
Planner’s Preferences. Finally, the RO has cardinal preferences over students
assignments given by ξ = (ξ1, · · · , ξM), which satisfies two properties: (i) ξ <
ξ1 < ξ2, · · · , ξM−1 < ξM < ξ and (ii) ξc+1 − ξc increasing for 2 ≤ c ≤ M . That
is, RO’s preferences are completely misaligned with students preference profile v′,
and display strict increasing differences.
Assignment Mechanism. Let µ denote amatching, namely a rule that assigns each
student to at most one college, and such that the number of students assigned to
4Notice that as the index of the student becomes higher, his priority decreases.
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a given college is less than or equal to the numbers of seats available. Denoting
M as the space of all matchings; an assignment mechanism is then a function
ψ : (R)N →M, where R represents the space of all rank order lists over C.
A mechanism ψK is called K-constrained mechanism if its domain is the set
of all ranked ordered lists over C truncated to the first K < M positions. In this
case, we have ψK : (RK)N →M. We consider constrained mechanisms to reflect
the fact that normally students are not allowed to submit a full list, but instead
are given limited options to report.
Every mechanism ψK induces a game of incomplete information in which the
students report a rank order list of length K, and given this profile of reports,
assignments are given according to ψK . Here, the mechanism ψk is a constrained
serial dictatorship.
Timing. Figure 3.1 depicts the timeline of the game. First, nature draws pref-
erences and scores for all students. Because scores are public information, each
student can determine his priority in the assignment process. Preferences, on the
other hand, are private information, and hence, students form beliefs over them
according to the common prior. Second, the RO announces the number of options
students are allowed to report, K. Once students observe this parameter, they
sumbit the rank order list of preferences -of length K- to the RO. Finally, the RO
runs a serial dictatorship algorithm and assignments and payoffs are realized.
3.2.1 Students Equilibrium Behavior
Given the environment introduced above, a pure strategy σs for each student
is a mapping σs : S ×V → RK . That is, given his index s and type preference vs,
a student chooses to report a rank order list to the RO. For simplicity, we denote
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Nature
draws students’
preferences and scores
The RO
announces K
Students submit
reports to the RO
Assignments
and payoffs
are realized
Figure 3.1: Timing of the admission game
σs(s, us) = rs. Hence, a profile of reports is denoted by R = (r1, · · · , rN).
When the profile of pure strategies (σs, σ−s) is played, the expected utility of
student s under the mechanism ψk, corresponds to:
EUs(σs, σ−s) =
∑
v∈VS
u(ψKs (R), vs, ρ)Pr(V ) (3.3)
A student with type vs reports truthfully if r`s = o`(vs) for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ K.
5 We say that a mechanism is strategy proof if truthfully reporting is a weakly
dominant strategy for every student s and every type vs ∈ V .
When students are not allowed to report a complete order over C the serial
dictatorship mechanism is not strategy proof (c.f. Haeringer and Klijn (2009)).
Hence, it is not possible to use a dominant strategy equilibrium as a solution con-
cept. Instead, we rely on the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies
to solve the game.
Although there is no equilibrium in dominant strategies, the hierarchical na-
ture of the admission decision process has the characteristic that, students with
priority higher than K have always a weakly dominant strategy, as presented in
the following proposition.
5Analogously with true preferences, for any pure strategy σ, we denote by r` the college
reported in the `-th position by a student with type vs.
69
Proposition 3. Fix 1 ≤ K < M . For any student s ≤ K truthfully reporting is
a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof. Fix a student s ≤ K and type vs. First, notice that for any belief on the
strategy profile of other students, reporting the first K preferred colleges consti-
tutes a weakly dominant strategy. We have to show that for any non-truthful
strategy σ˜s there exists a full support belief such that report according to σ˜s is
dominated.
Fix an index ` ≤ s ≤ K, and suppose that the preference type of all students
with higher priority than s rank the first `−1 colleges in the same way as student s,
an event that has strict positive probability. Moreover, assume that such students
report truthfully their preferences.
Now, suppose student s reports according to the pure strategy σ˜s(s, vs) = r˜s,
such that:
r˜js =

oj(vs) ∀ j < `
oh(vs) for j = ` and some h > `
Under this strategy, student s will be assigned to his hth preferred college, whereas
if he reports truthfully he would be assigned to his `th preferred college.
Proposition 3 establishes that students with priority higher than or equal to K
will always report truthfully. This results simplifies substantially the analysis of
equilibrium, since for any value of the restriction K it is only necessary to inspect
the behavior of the students with lower priority than K: those without a trivial
best response.
We need to first find the best response of student s = K + 1. Toward this
aim, let δ : S × (RK)N−1 → {0, 1}M be an operator such that δ(s, R−s) returns a
vector with an entry of one in the `-th position if college ` has an available seat
for student s, when his fellow students report R−s, and zero otherwise.
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Thus, we can compute the vector of ex-ante admission probabilities for student
s as follows
ηs(σ−s) =
∑
v−s∈VS−1
δ(s, R−s)Pr−s(V−s) (3.4)
Hence, ηs(c, σ−s) denotes the probability that student s gets admission into
college c, when the profile of strategies σ−s is played. Then, for any two students
s and s˜ such that s < s˜, ηs(c, σ−s) ≥ ηs˜(c, σ−s˜), for all c ∈ C and for any profile σ.
Even though for presentation purposes we consider the profile of strategies
played by all fellows of student s, the reports of individuals with lower priority
than him are irrelevant to calculate his chances to get admission in any college.
Let q`−1s (rs, σ−s) be the probability that the student s have been rejected by
the first `−1 colleges reported in rs, given that the rest of the students are playing
according to σ−s. Such probability is computed as follows 6
q`−1s (rs, σ−s) =

∏`−1
j=1 1− ηs(rjs, σ−s) for ` = 2, · · · , K
1 for ` = 1
Once we derive the vector of admission probabilities, we can convert the prob-
lem of finding student s’s optimal strategy into an individual decision problem
where he solves an expected utility maximization problem. Specifically, the strat-
egy σs is a best response to the profile σ−s, if σs(s, vs) solves
max
r∈RK
K∑
`=1
q`−1s (rs, σ−s)ηs(r`s, σ−s)u(r`s, vs, ρ) (3.5)
6For instance, recall from the example in section 3.1 that when students are allowed to report
only two options and they follow the equilibrium strategy prescribed there, student 3 has the
following admission probabilities
η3(σ∗−3) = (1/16, 3/8, 9/16, 1)
Thus, if he reports the tuple (X,W ) to the RO, his expected utility would be (1/16)(9/16)uX3 +
(1−1/16)uW3 . In this case, since K = 2, the rejection function is only defined for the first option:
q1((X,W ), σ∗−3) = (1− 1/16).
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We can proceed inductively, in the same fashion, to recover the best response
of all succeeding students.
Once students find their optimal rank order list, they report it to the RO, who
runs the algorithm and assign students to colleges. How the planner values such
allocation is the matter of the next section.
3.2.2 Planer’s Maximization Problem
As highlighted in the introduction and the example, one of the differences of the
present paper with respect to standard matching literature, is that the planner (in
this case the RO) evaluates students’ assignments with respect to its preferences
over the innovation produced by admitted students. Therefore, it is interested
in designing an admission mechanism to maximize the value of the innovation
produced. Formally, we assume that a student with score xs who is assigned
to college c produces ξcφ(xs) units of innovation, where ξc is a parameter that
denotes RO’s preferences over colleges, or in other words, how the RO values the
innovation produced in each of the colleges; and φ(xs) represents the productivity
of student s. 7 We assume the function φ(xs) is strictly increasing.
Hence, fixing K, and assuming that students will report according to the equi-
librium strategies σ∗ = (σ∗1, · · ·σ∗N), planner’s expected innovation corresponds
to
I(K) =
N∑
s=1
∑
v∈VN
ξψKs (R∗)φ(xs)Pr(V ) (3.6)
The main result of the paper, outlined in the next section, shows that the
7A planner might prefer to bring more capable students to certain colleges that it deems as
crucial for the development of the economy, even though they are not the most preferred by the
student body. In the definition of innovation we implicitly assume that a student with score xs
produces the same amount of innovation in all colleges. We could make it dependent on the
specific college, but to maintain tractability we assume homogeneity.
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optimal level of K is strictly lower than the total number of colleges M .
3.3 Optimal Constrained Choice
In this section we will show that under some conditions on preferences, dis-
tributions and students’ risk aversion, letting students to report fewer options
than the total of colleges available (i.e. constraining the choice) is optimal for the
planner.
First, we will identify the set of values K that induce a different equilibrium
assignment from the full list case. Then, restricting K to this set, we will show
that if students are sufficiently risk averse, they will choose the K colleges with
highest probability of admission, but will order them with respect to their true
preference profile. Finally, we will show that if the differences in the intensity of
planner’s preferences are decreasing and sufficiently high, the higher probability
to seat a better student in a more preferred college more than compensates the
small probability of wasting a seat.
The first step consists in determining the number of options K that would
induce a different allocation from the full list case. The relevant values to consider
are those that effectively imposes a binding constraint for at least one student
with priority lower than K.
Let Γs = {c ∈ C : ηs(c, σ∗−s) > 0} be the set of colleges with positive admission
probability for student s under the profile of equilibrium strategies σ∗.
Lemma 1. The values of the restriction that potentially induce a different equi-
librium allocation with respect to the full list case are those K ≤ K, where
K = max{K : there exists s > K with |Γs| > K}.
Proof. Suppose that the planner sets a value of K such that |Γs| < K for all
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students with priority lower than K (i.e. all students s > K). Then, best strategy
for those students with lower priority is to report all the colleges with positive
probability according to his true preference profile, whereas the students with
priority higher than K will report truthfully. Hence, there is no change in the
equilibrium allocation with respect to the full-list case, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 1 says that setting the value of K close to the number of colleges avail-
ableM , is not useful for the planner, because he will be “imposing a restriction” on
students who do not have enough options with positive probability, and therefore,
it will not have any effect on their decision problem.
Once the planner sets the restriction according to lemma 1, students have to
choose the optimal portfolio of colleges given the collection of probabilities implied
by the equilibrium played.
Proposition 4. Fix K ≤ K¯. If students with priority lower than K are suffi-
ciently risk averse, their best response corresponds to the following pure strategy:
Choose the K colleges with the highest probability of admission, and report them
truthfully using their true preference profile.
Proof. Given the vector of admission probabilities and cardinal utilities, each stu-
dent solves his correspondent optimization problem stated in equation (3.5), since
for students with a priority lower than K reporting truthfully is not a weakly
dominant strategy.
By theorem 1 in Chade and Smith (2006), we can proceed sequentially to find
the solution of each student’s combinatorial problem. Specifically, in the first
stage we choose the option that yields the largest expected utility, and then in
step `, ` ≥ 2, we select the option that yields the largest marginal benefit over the
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portfolio of colleges constructed so far. 8
The goal is to find a sufficiently high level of the risk aversion parameter, that
leads student s to choose the portfolio consisting of the colleges with the K highest
probabilities of admission.
Pick a student s with priority lower than K (i.e. s > K) and let ΓKs be the
set of his K colleges with the highest probability of admission. Denote r1s(v′s) =
arg max{u(c, v′s, ρ)·ηs(c, σ∗−s), c ∈ C} It can be shown that there exists a sufficiently
high level of risk aversion ρ1s(v′s), such that r1s(v′s) ∈ ΓKs . In the same fashion define
recursively rjs(v′s) = arg max{u(c, v′s, ρ) · ηs(c, σ∗−s), c ∈ C\{r1s(v′s), · · · rj−1s (v′s)}} for
j = 2, · · · , K. As before, we can find a sufficiently high level of risk aversion ρjs(v′s)
such that rjs(v′s) ∈ ΓKs . Thus, there would be a collection of risk aversion parame-
ters such that the optimal portfolio consists on the K colleges with higher proba-
bility of admission. Then, take ρs(v′s) = max{ρ1s(v′s), · · · , ρKs (v′s)}. We can proceed
analogously for the profile v′′s to find ρs(v′′s ). Finally, take ρs = max{ρ′s, ρ′′s}. Hence,
if ρ > maxs>K{ρs} the optimal strategy for those students where the constraint
binds, is the prescribed in the proposition. 9
For the moment we will assume that preferences v′, v′′ and the probability p
of drawing the profile v′, are such that, for the marginal student s = K + 1 the
minimum probability of being admitted to any of the K least preferred colleges
under v′, is higher than the probability of being admitted into any of the other
colleges. In the next section we will construct a class of preferences that satisfies
this endogenous property. Recall that the profile v′ is completely misaligned with
8Chade and Smith call this procedure the Marginal Improvement Algorithm (MIA) and show
that it reach the same global solution as the original combinatorial problem in a quadratic
number of steps.
9Later on we will assume that the preference profile v′ is the most popular profile, and so,
computing the risk aversion level ρs(v′s) would suffice.
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planner’s preferences ξ, and so this condition says that it is safer for the marginal
student to apply to the colleges that are more preferred by the RO.
Denote Λ` the set of the 1 ≤ ` ≤ M least preferred colleges under the profile
v′.
Assumption 1. Let s = k+1 be the marginal student. We assume that min{ηs(c, σ∗−s), c ∈
ΛK} ≥ max{ηs(c, σ∗−s), c ∈ C\ΛK}.
Assumption 1 merely says that colleges preferred by the RO have higher prob-
abilities of admission. In the same line, it is possible to define which report of
majors is more aligned with RO’s preferences. Recall that for any two colleges c
and c˜ such that c > c˜, we have ξc > ξc˜. In other words, the RO prefers colleges
with higher index.
Let rs , min{r`s : 1 ≤ ` ≤ K} and rs , max{r`s : 1 ≤ ` ≤ K}. That is, rs is
the college with lowest index chosen by rs, and likewise for rs.
Definition 5. The report rs is more aligned with planner’s preferences than r˜s
(viz. rs  r˜s), if r˜s ≤ rs and r˜s ≤ rs, with at least one strict inequality.
Now, we have all the necessary pieces to set our main result: constraining the
choice is optimal for the Registrar Office.
Theorem 2. Suppose that assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, if students are suffi-
ciently risk averse, there exist planner preferences ξ, such that I(K) > I(M) for
some K ≤ K¯.
Proof. Denote Ω = {s > K : |Γs| > K}. That is, Ω denotes the set of students
with priority lower than K, who have more than K colleges with positive probabil-
ity of admission, and thus affected by setting the number of options in K instead
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of M . This is the relevant set of students where the restriction induces a different
assignment equilibrium.
Furthemore, there exists a subset Ωˆ ⊆ Ω, such that for all s, s˜ ∈ Ωˆ, with s > s˜,
we have that rs  rs˜. Indeed, by proposition 4 and assumption 1 student s = K+1
will report the K least preferred colleges under preference v′, which represents the
maximum level of alignment with planner’s preferences. Now consider, student
s = K + 2. Suppose by contradiction that rK+2  rK+1. Then, by assumption
1 and the fact that ηs(c, σ∗) ≥ ηs+1(c, σ∗) for all c, it would imply that student
s = K + 1 is not choosing the K colleges with highest probability of admission,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the best students in Ωˆ report colleges more
aligned with the planner.
For all students s ∈ Ω\Ωˆ it is possible to see that, in the worst case scenario
for the RO, they will report according to the full list case.
Therefore, since planner’s preferences satisfy increasing differences, and ad-
mission probabilities are decreasing in Ω, there exists a preference profile ξ such
that the gains of seating better students in a more preferred college, more than
compensates the potential loss of wasting a seat.
3.4 Justifying Monotnocity in Probabilities
In this section we will show a class of preferences for which assumption 1 is
plausible. It is a class where the profile v′ (the one misaligned with planner’s pref-
erences) is pivotal, and the profile v′′ just rearranges the order of v′ by segments.
The intuition behind this construction resides in the fact that normally students
agree on which groups of colleges are preferred to others, but may disagree in
the way the rank colleges within each group. Such description is captured by the
following assumption.
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Assumption 2. The profile v′′ is obtained from v′ as follows
oc(v′′) =

pi1(c) if c ∈ [1, z]
pi2(c) if c ∈ [z + 1, 2z]
...
pin(c) if c ∈ [(n− 1)z + 1, nz]
...
(3.7)
where z is the length of the each partition, and {pi1, pi2, · · · , pin, · · · } is a collection
of permutations defined over the relevant domains. 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12v′:
v′′: 3 2 4 1 8 6 5 7 10 12 9 11
pi1 pi2 pi3
Figure 3.2: An example for the construction of preferences.
Here, there are 12 colleges divided in three partitions of three colleges each,
and ordered increasingly under the pivotal profile v′. The alternative profile v′′ is
constructed from v′ as a permutation in each partition. Specifically, both profiles
agree in that colleges 1− 4 are better than colleges 5− 8, and in turn that these
are better than colleges 9 − 12. However, within the first partition the profile v′′
ranks college 3 as the best and college 1 as the worst. Likewise, in the second
parition, college 8 is the worst under v′ but the best under v′′.
That is, v′′ is a piecewise permutation of v′. As mentioned before, the intervals
of colleges can be interpreted as “academic areas” and the elements within that
interval as colleges in such area. Hence, we assume that both preference profiles
10We assume that the number of partitions is greater than two, and that at least one permu-
tation is different from the identity, such that the new order o(v′′) is different from o(v′).
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rank the academic areas in the same way, but within each area the order of the
colleges can vary. Furthermore, we assume that the cardinal utility associated
with each position in the preference relation is fixed but the colleges that occupy
each position can vary. For instance, in both profiles the cardinal utility of the
third most preferred college is the same, but with respect to the profile v′ such
college is college 3, while with respect to the profile v′′ it is the college given by
opi
−1(3)(v′).
This assumption is essential to guarantee that the least preferred colleges with
respect to v′ have always a positive probability of admission for the marginal
student affected by the restriction.
Given that for students with priority higher than or equal to K, reporting
truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy, the admission probabilities for all stu-
dents with priority higher than K only depend on the distribution of preferences.
Denoting M(c, v′) be the number of colleges preferred to college c with respect
to v′, and analogously for M(c, v′′); admission probabilities can be computed as
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any student s ≤ k + 1, if M(c, v′) +M(c, v′′) ≥ s− 1 the ex-ante
probability that such student s get into college c, corresponds to
ηs(c, σ∗−s) =

min{s−1,M(c,v′)}∑
j=max{0,s−1−M(c,v′′)}
(
s− 1
j
)
pj(1− p)s−1−j if M(c, v′) ≥M(c, v′′)
min{s−1,M(c,v′′)}∑
j=max{0,s−1−M(c,v′)}
(
s− 1
j
)
ps−1−j(1− p)j if M(c, v′) < M(c, v′′)
(3.8)
otherwise if it is equal to zero.
Proof. By the result of proposition 3 any student with priority higher than or equal
to K will report truthfully. Moreover, since the acceptance algorithm is a serial
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dictatorship, at least one student will be assigned to the college c if M(c, v′) +
M(c, v′′) < s− 1.
Now, ifM(c, v′)+M(c, v′′) ≥ s−1 it is possible to choose the preference profiles
of all predecessors of student s in such a way that -taking into account they will
report truthfully- leaves a seat open in college c. Clearly, we have to choose at
mostM(c, v′) students to assign them the profile v′ and at mostM(c, v′′) to assign
them the profile v′′. Moreover, ifM(c, v′) ≥M(c, v′′), we have to assign the profile
v′ to at least s − 1 −M(c, v′′) students whenever this number is positive. Since
the profile v′ occurs with probability p, the probability that student s gets a seat
in college c is given by
min{s−1,M(c,v′′)}∑
j=max{0,s−1−M(c,v′′)}
(
s− 1
j
)
pj(1− p)s−1−j
Likewise if M(c, v′) < M(c, v′′).
Assuming this chracterization of preferences, notice that ifK ∈ [(n−1)z+1, nz]
(i.e if K is in the nth partition), then for the marginal student the probability of
getting admission into any college c > nz is equal to one. It follows because
no predecessor will be seated in any of those colleges, given their equilibrium
strategies. If there are more than K of such colleges, or in other words ifM−nz ≥
K, the condition in 1 is satisfied.
Now, suppose that M − nz < K. In this case the result cannot be guaranteed
from the sole configuration of preferences, however if p > p¯ and z ≤ z¯ for suitably
chosen p¯ and z¯, the result is guaranteed. That is, if the degree in the variability of
the profile v′′ with respect to the pivotal profile v′ -capture by the length of each
partition- is sufficiently low; and the probability of the pivotal profile is sufficiently
high, the assumption 1 can be guaranteed, and so the argument in section 3.3.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
In centralized admission mechanisms, where a registrar office assigns seats in
colleges to students -given preferences and priorities, a customary practice is to
constrain the number of options students are able to report. That is, students
are not authorized to report a full list over the set of available colleges. It is well
known in the literature, however, that such practice distort many of the desirable
properties of the mechanisms utilized, such as strategy-proofness, and yet the
computational cost of letting students report the full list is negligible.
The present article reconciles this discrepancy by assuming that there is a plan-
ner that has preferences over the innovation students can produce in their assigned
colleges. Innovation is a simple measure captured by an increasing function of stu-
dents’ cognitive ability, which is approximated in the model by students’ score in
the admission test. The crucial factor is that the planner does not value equally
the innovation produced in the different colleges, and so is in their benefit to seat
the best students in its preferred colleges.
Restricting the number of options to report serves the purpose of maximiz-
ing the expected aggregated innovation under two fundamental assumptions: (i)
students are sufficiently risk averse, and (ii) planner preferences over colleges are
misaligned with students’ preferences. These two assumptions combined, assures
that students will apply to the colleges with the higher probability of admission,
which happen to be the least preferred from students’ perspective, but the most
preferred for the planner.
One important caveat is that a higher restriction also increases the probability
of wasting a seat, however, if planner’s preferences exhibit increasing differences,
the gain of seating a better student in a more preferred college more than offset
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this potential loss.
Now, as suggested above, our main result is driven by the fact that admssion
probabilities have to be higher for the less popular colleges among students, but
the most preferred by the planner. This condition is sufficient to generate our
result, however, it is not clear which assumptions over the model’s primitives
could generate it. To correct this weakness, we construct a class of preferences
that generates this property. It is a class with two preference profiles, where
one is pivotal, and the other is constructed from it by permutting the ranking
of the colleges within intervals. The argument is that in both profiles students
agree over which academic areas are preferred, but disagree in the way they rank
colleges within each area.
Under the latter constuction we show that if the pivotal profile is sufficiently
high, and the planner preferences are completely misaligned with respect to the
pivotal (more popular) profile, letting students to report the full list is dominated
with respect to the objective of maximizing the expected aggregated innovation.
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Chapter 4
BIDDING WITH SECURITIES IN PROJECTS UNDER NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES (WITH ANDRES FIORITI)
Over the last two decades, the sector of technological firms have witnessed a
flourishment without precedence, boosted among others, by the presence of inter-
net and a robust market of patents. The role of this market has been twofold.
From one hand, it has allowed companies to monetize their inventions by auction-
ing them to a pool of interested firms, but at the same time has permitted the
same companies to acquire patents to develop their own products. Such environ-
ment has made possible for start-up companies -unlike in any other market- to
evolve into strong competitors, with a large market capitalization, in short time.
Remarkable examples include Uber -which reached a capitalization of $41 billion
in less than six years, the fastest in history- WhatsApp and Spnapchat. 1
Therefore, if a competitor acquires “the right” portfolio of patents, an operating
firm in a specific niche might promptly see its market share reduced, because it
would enable the competitor to develop its own innovation. For this reason, many
large firms acquire patents as a protective strategy: to preclude the development
of nascent companies that may change the status quo of its market participation.
Examples here include Facebook, Yahoo and Microsoft. 2 In addition, Hall and
Ziedonis (2001) find that after 1982, the US semiconductor firms started patent
portfolio races, not to appropriate R&D revenue, but to prevent other firms from
1For more details see http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber and
http://www.wsj.com/articles/snapchat.
2Recently Facebook acquired a portfolio of 750 patents to defend itself from a lawsuit from
Yahoo and other companies. See http://techcrunch.com/2012/03/23/facebook
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getting these patents.
This scenario raises many interesting questions. First, if a start-up is selling
its project -or innovation- through a standard second price auction and wants to
maximize revenue, we could ask what the optimal method of payment is. Should
the seller conduct the auction in cash, or should he use a security, contingent
on project’s return? This dichotomy has relevance, because if the innovation is
allotted to a firm that intends not to implement the project, the seller would
receive a payoff of zero if he uses a security. On the other hand, if the project
only has value for the winner when he implements it, the seller might be better
off using a contingent payment as it is more sensitive to bidder’s true valuation
(c.f. DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz, 2005).
A related question is how bidders’ optimal strategies behave under the presence
of a negative externality, given the method of payment. Here, the key observation
is that the presence of a negative externality increases the eagerness of the bidders
to win the auction, even when they attach a very low valuation to the project.
To answer these questions, we build a model where the seller sells the rights of
a project through a standard second price auction, but where he can utilize two
hybrids as methods of payment: (i) a fixed-equity hybrid where the seller fixes the
fraction of equity requested, and let bidders compete in cash, and (ii) a fixed-cash
hybrid, where the seller fixes the amount of cash the winner has to pay, and let
bidders compete in equity. Notice that the former embeds pure cash whereas the
latter embeds pure equity.
The reason for which including a fixed payment in the instruments may be
beneficial for the seller, resides in the problem of adverse selection associated with
the incentives of a buyer to participate in the auction. Specifically, a buyer may
want to participate in the auction either to try to implement the project (because
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it is profitable to do so), or just to attempt to block the allocation of his rival. If
the seller is paid upon the implementation of the project, allocating it to a buyer
of the second class (i.e. “the bad type”) would be detrimental for his revenue.
In the absence of a fixed payment, the bad type have always an incentive to
participate in the auction to try to destroy the equilibrium where the project is
implemented. Thus, the fixed payment acts as a screening device among bidders.
However, the seller faces a clear trade-off in his aim, because introducing a fixed
payment decreases the profitability of the project for all buyers, which in turn
leads to a lower probability of implementation. The goal of the present article
is to determine the optimal fixed payment for both hybrids, and rank them with
respect to seller’s expected revenue.
Certainly, our article is not the first interested in exploring the relation be-
tween revenue and the method of payment used in an auction. In fact, De Marzo,
Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) has shown that if there are no externalities, the
methods of payment can be ranked in revenue by their “steepness”, or the sensi-
tivity of bidder’s true type to the instrument utilized. An insight first hinted by
Hansen (1985) and Riley (1988). They also show that the auction format has only
an impact on revenue by its ability of modifying the steepness of the particular
instrument utilized. Nonetheless, to arrive to their conclusions it is crucial that
bidders operate in an environment free of negative externalities. When we incor-
porate them into the model, their main result does not hold anymore, precisely
because a winner of the auction may acquire the project not to implement it.
In order to isolate the effect produced by the interaction of the externalities
with the method of payment, we focus on a simple model of two bidders, where the
loser of the auction suffers a commonly known negative externality if the winner
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implements the project. 3 This framework arises naturally in industries where
bidding firms are similar ex-ante, and the project gives a comparative advantage
in the downstream market to the winner. Surprisingly, many of the insights can
be captured with this simple version. First, we consider a simple model where
both, externalities and valuations are public information. Even in this simple
framework the characterization of equilibria is not trivial, because it depends
on the interaction of the externality, the cost of the project and bidder’s own
valuation.
Our main result, stated in theorem 3, shows that under some mild technical
conditions, the following is satisfied. First, the optimal fixed-equity requires a
strictly positive equity payment, and the optimal fixed-cash hybrid involves a
strictly positive payment in cash. Second, the optimal fixed-equity hybrid is the
instrument that yields the highest expected revenue, followed by cash, which in
turn is followed by the optimal fixed-cash hybrid. Equity is the worst instrument
in the menu, despite of being the steepest.
The intuition of the latter results lies in the fact that with equity, a bidder
will pay zero if he does not implement the project, but his bid will affect the
profitability of implementing the project for his opponent. In that sense, a partic-
ular buyer can effectively use the threatening-power equity equips bidders with,
to destroy the equilibria when the other buyer finds profitable to implement the
project. When the seller uses cash as the instrument, this problem is mitigated
by the fact that all payments are made upfront, rather than conditional on the
implementation of the project. Therefore, the optimal instrument for the seller
would be one that simultaneously features the screening benefits offered by cash,
3One important clarification is that we use the word implementation, because if an agent
wins the object but does not implement it, no agent suffer any externality.
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and the ability of equity to extract surplus. This design is precisely at the heart of
the fixed equity hybrid. On the other hand, when the seller sets the fixed payment
in terms of cash, and let buyers use equity to screen themselves, buyers conserve
part of their power to block the implementation of the project, and so the adverse
selection motive dominates. Surprisingly, this effect is so powerful that the optimal
fixed-cash hybrid performs worse than cash for a sufficiently low implementation
cost and a sufficiently high negative externality.
The ranking of the instruments is robust to the structure of information, as
it is preserved for a large class of log concave distributions over private buyers’
valuation. In particular, equity continues to deliver zero revenue despite of being
the steepest instrument in the menu. Even though, we cannot deliver a general
theorem as in the case of public information, we obtain very similar results via a
simulation.
Finally, in a comparative statics exercise, theorem 4 finds that the fixed por-
tion of both instruments is weakly increasing with respect to an improvement in
the distributions, in the sense implied by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR)
property. This result is clearly intuitive: as the probability of drawing higher
valuation increases, the seller is less concerned of inducing participation, and can
commit himself to extract a higher portion of revenue before the competition in
the auction takes place.
Related Literature Our article is related to the literature of auctions with
securities and to the literature of auctions with externalities. Nonetheless, as
far as we know this is the first article connecting both strands of literature, to
analyze how the interaction of negative externalities and securities impact bidding
strategies and seller’s expected revenue. Moreover, as we discussed before, due to
the implementability incentives of buyers, our model can also be framed in the
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literature of auctions under adverse selection.
The literature of auctions with securities started with the seminal articles of
Hansen (1985) and Riley (1988), who basically showed that a second price auction
run in equity yields higher expected revenue to the seller than one run in cash.
More recently, De Marzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) -hereafter DKS- gener-
alize this framework by providing a methodology to rank securities with respect
to revenue. Specifically, they characterize the “steepness” or sensitivity of several
instruments via a single crossing property argument, and show that steeper in-
struments yield a higher revenue for the seller. Furthermore, they argue that the
auction format is only relevant as long as it modifies the steepness of the instru-
ment utilized. 4 Although DKS analyze a larger class of securities than what
we do in this article, the main essence of their analysis is retained, because the
distinction of the payment condition (i.e. contingent vs non-contingent) is the
key ingredient to obtain our main result. As mentioned before, we focus in two
hybrid instruments that are used in practice, and which include cash and equity
as particular cases. 5
Abishek, Hajek and Williams (2013) analyzes profit sharing contracts between
a seller and the winning bidder, much in the spirit of our fixed-equity hybrid.
Nonetheless, they conduct their analysis in a more general setting. In their model,
signals over project’s realized value can be interdependent, and bidders can be
risk averse. They consider two types of securities, one where the seller shares only
profits with the wining bidder, and one where the seller shares both profits and
4In particular, they prove that when the seller uses securities the Revenue Equivalence The-
orem may not hold.
5Our fixed-equity hybrid resembles the way writers sell the rights of their books because there
is a fixed royalty rate and publishers compete on cash. On the other side our fixed-cash hybrid
captures the main feature of the oil rights auction in Mexico where buyers pay a fixed amount
and compete on equity.
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loses with the winner.
Abhishek et al. show that both securities yield a higher expected revenue to
the seller than using a one-time payment in cash, which is also consistent with
our findings. Furthermore, they show that using a security where the seller shares
profits and loses, also yields a higher revenue than their counterpart with only
profit sharing. This result does not necessarily depends on bidders’ risk aversion.
In fact, as long as signals are interdependent, it can also be generated with risk
neutral bidders.
Extensions to this literature include the works of Gorbenko and Malenko (2011)
and Che (2010). The former analyzes the predictions of a DKS model when the
set of bidders is finite and many sellers compete for them. Their main result shows
that sellers will not use the steepest instrument because they would not attract
enough bidders. We also obtain the same result but for different reasons. In our
case, using a pure security is detrimental for seller’s revenue because it allows
buyers, who do not intend to implement the project, to destroy the equilibria
where good-type buyers would have implemented it otherwise.
Meanwhile, Che and Kim (2010) modify DKS framework by assuming that
buyers with higher valuations also have a higher cost to implement the project.
This simple modification leads to an adverse selection problem when the seller
uses a security, because buyers with high valuation would bid a lower amount, and
therefore, more often such buyers will win the auction. As the revenue of the seller
is tied to bidders’ true type when he uses a security, this adverse selection problem
cause the revenue to decrease. We found that using securities when externalities
are present can lead to the same result. Here, the low-valuation buyers would bid
more aggressively because they want to avoid the negative externality, and can
block implementation at no cost when the seller uses pure securities. Nonetheless,
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whereas Che and Kim (2010) makes assumptions on the cost structure of the
model, we make assumptions on the after-market behavior of firms, which we
consider more significant in many patent auctions where securities are normally
utilized.
Our article also contributes -in minor extent- to the literature of auctions
with externalities, initiated by Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996, 1999).
However, rather than proposing an optimal mechanism under an environment
with externalities, we analyze a small but widely used class of instruments, which
unlike Jehiel et al. also incorporates securities as a method of payment. We are
able to show that under negative externalities, a second price auction in cash is
no longer an optimal mechanism, because in our model we find that the best
instrument is a fixed-equity hybrid.
Organization of the article The rest of the article is structured as follows.
Section 4.1 states the environment of the model. In section 4.2 we introduce the
case of complete information, derive the equilibrium bidding strategies, and rank
the instruments with respect to revenue. Section 4.3 presents a robustness exercise
for the case of private information. Section 4.4 concludes. Some of the proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
4.1 The Environment
A seller is interested in allocating an indivisible asset -which can be thought
as the rights of a project or innovation- among two different buyers. The winner
is required to pay a cost of c > 0 in order to implement the project, which is
considered as the initial investment to run the project, and is commonly known.
We index buyers by i = 1, 2 whereas the seller is designated as player i = 0. Buyer
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i’s valuation vi is drawn identically and independently from [v, v¯], according to the
distribution F which corresponding non-atomic density f .
If the project is implemented by a competitor, buyer i suffers a negative ex-
ternality of e ∈ [e¯, 0], which we assume is symmetric and publicly known among
buyers. One important aspect of our model is that externalities are contingent
to the implementation of the allotted buyer. Second, private valuation refers to
the gross return of the project, and so a rational winner i will only implement it
if vi − c > 0. Third, even if a buyer does not want to implement the project it
would be beneficial for him to acquire it to preclude the implementation by other
competitors, and thus avoiding the potential negative externality he might suffer.
The seller commits to use a second price auction to sell the project, but we
assume he can utilize two different instruments: a fixed-equity hybrid and a fixed-
cash hybrid. In the former the seller fixes the equity over project’s return requested
from the winner, and let bidders to compete in cash. The winner is the buyer who
submits the highest bid in cash but pays the bid of his opponent. Clearly, a
standard second price auction with cash corresponds to the case when the seller
request zero equity. On the other hand, when the seller uses a fixed-cash hybrid,
he fixes an amount in cash the winner of the auction has to pay, and let buyers to
compete in equity. As before, the winner of the auction is the buyer who submits
the highest equity bid, but pays the lowest bid. In this case, when the seller asks
a fixed cash of zero, the auction is conducted in pure equity.
All players are risk neutral, and buyers’ utility is additively separable. Let zi be
the return buyer i derives from the project after his implementation decision. That
is, zi = vi − c if he implements the project and zero otherwise. Thus, if buyer
i, with type vi, wins the auction his payoff is given by zi − ti(vi), where ti(vi)
represents the payment to the seller, which potentially depends on his valuation.
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On the other hand, if the seller allocates the object to buyer j, then buyer i’s
payoff corresponds to e, provided his competitor implements the project; and zero
otherwise. The value of the project for the seller is zero, and hence in any trade
with buyer i his utility is ti(vi). 6 If no trade occurs, the payoff is zero for all
players.
Figure 4.1 depicts the timing of the game. First, seller chooses a payment
instrument and commits to run a second price auction under this format. Then,
buyers learn their valuations and submit their bids to the seller, who determines
the winner of the auction. Next, the winner determines if he wants to implement
or not the project. Finally, payoffs are realized contingent on the implementation
decision.
Seller
chooses an
instrument
Buyers
learn their
valuations
Bids are
submitted
Winner
decides upon
implementation
Payoffs
are
realized
Figure 4.1: Timing of the auction
4.2 Public Buyer’s Valuation
In this section we assume that before participating in the auction, each buyer
learns his own valuation as well as the valuation of his opponent. Without loss
of generality we will assume v1 > v2. The seller, on the other hand, only knows
the distribution where buyers’ valuations come from. Nonetheless, the negative
externality is public information for all players. This setting plausibly corresponds
6Think for example in a seller who owns a patent over a specific productive process that by
itself cannot be monetized, but can potentially enhance the productivity of the current technology
held by the buyers.
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to a situation where both buyers have been operating in a market for long time
and have learned the technology of each opponent, but where a seller is an outsider
of the industry who has developed an innovation that can enhance the technology
of both buyers, but cannot evaluate to which extent.
The seller wants to maximize the ex-ante revenue and for that purpose has
to choose which instrument to utilize. Once the seller chooses an instrument he
commits to it. Thus, bidders are engaged in a game of public information, where
they have to choose their bid bi in the correspondent security space. In the case
of the fixed-equity hybrid bi ∈ R+, whereas in the case of the fixed-cash hybrid
bi ∈ [0, 1].
A Motivating Example In this section we will go through an easy example
that will highlight the main results of the article.
A. No Externalties Consider an auction in which two buyers, Alice and Bob,
compete for a project. The project requires an initial fixed investment of c > 0
which can be interpreted as the minimum up-front cash payment required by
the seller. Alice expects that if she undertakes the project, it would yield her a
return of va, whereas Bob expects a cash flow of vb. Without loss of generality,
c < vb < va. We assume that both valuations are common knowledge to both
buyers. As the seller commits to use a second price auction, the weakly dominant
strategy for both buyers is to bid their reservation value. As a result, Alice would
bid ba(va) = va − c and Bob would bid bb(vb) = vb − c. Hence, Alice wins the
auction and pays Bob’s bid, which implies seller’s revenue would be Πca = vb − c.
Now, suppose that rather than bidding with cash, the buyers compete by
offering equity over the return of the project. As we discuss later, in this case it
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is also a weakly dominant strategy for both buyers to bid their reservation value.
7 Thus, Alice would make aa equity bid of ba(va) = va−cva , whereas Bob would
make an equity bid of bb(vb) = vb−cvb . As a result, Alice wins the auction and
pays according to Bob’s bid. Seller’s revenue would be Πeq = vb−c
vb
va. By an easy
algebraic manipulation, it is possible to see that sellers revenue under equity is
higher than under cash, as
Πeq = vb − c
vb
va = (vb − c)va
vb
> vb − c = Πca
B. Externalities Consider the same auction as before but now with the modi-
fication that if buyer i wins the auction and implements the project, the payoff of
buyer −i will be e < 0.
Cash. When the payment instrument is cash, bidding the reservation value
continue to be a weakly dominant strategy for both buyers. Nonetheless, it now
should include the externality. Thus, ba(va) = va − c− e and bb(vb) = vb − c− e.
Seller’s revenue becomes Πca = vb − c− e.
Equity. If buyers compete by offering equity the analysis is more interesting.
Here, Alice knows that if she bids ba(va) = va−cva then Bob has no incentives to
implement the project in case he wins, because (1 − va−c
va
)vb − c < 0. 8 This
implies that Alice will be willing to make the same offer as without externalities.
For Bob, the incentives in the auction change. On one hand, he can bid his
reservation value, lose the auction, let Alice implement the project, and obtain a
payoff of e < 0. On the other hand, he can bid higher than Alice, win the auction,
shut down the project, and obtain a payoff of 0. By comparing both scenarios, it
7The reservation value of buyer i is when his payoff equals 0: (1 − bi(vi))vi − c = 0 thus
bi(vi) = vi−cvi .
8As (1− va−cva )va − c = 0 and vb < va.
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is clear that Bob’s optimal strategy is to bid anything on the interval (ba(va), 1]
and secure for himself a payoff of 0. Seller’s revenue becomes Πeq = 0 in this case.
Fixed-Equity and Fixed-Cash. To conclude the example we will provide
a rationale for introducing a fixed-equity and a fixed-cash hybrid as methods of
payment. By definition, the revenue collected by both instruments depends on the
selection of the fixed component. The challenge for the seller resides in choosing
such fixed components when he only knows the distribution of valuations. For
instance, if the seller sets a very high fixed equity α¯, buyers may lose the incentive
to participate in the auction. Likewise, if he sets a very low fixed cash b¯, he would
not be extracting as much surplus as possible from the winner.
The following table shows the values of α¯∗, Πfe, b¯∗, Πfc, Πca and Πeq for
different distributions of types when the cost of implementing the project is c = 0.1
and the externality is e = −0.2.
Table 4.1: Seller expected revenue under optimal securities: Public Info
Expected Seller Revenue
Distribution α¯∗ b¯∗ Πfe(α¯∗) Πca Πfc(b¯∗) Πeq
U [0, 1] 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.44 0.32 0
B[2, 2] 0.49 0.43 0.57 0.47 0.3 0
B[2, 7] 0.1 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.09 0
IB[2, 7]9 0.73 0.63 0.90 0.80 0.56 0
By looking at the distributions and the revenues some facts can be highlighted:
9The Inverse-Beta distribution is computed from a former Beta distribution. If f(x) repre-
sents the PDF of a Beta then the PDF of an Inverse-Beta would be g(y) = f(−x + 1). If the
former Beta distribution had a right tail then the Inverse-Beta associated to it will have a left
tail. When the former Beta is symmetric then the Inverse-Beta is exactly the same.
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• When comparing symmetric distributions α¯∗, b¯∗, Πfe(α¯∗), Πca, and Πfc(b¯∗)
are very similar.
• When the relative likelihood of high types to low types increases, α¯∗, b¯∗,
Πfe(α¯∗), Πca, and Πfc(b¯∗) increase as well.
• Given c = 0.1 and e = −0.2 the rank of the instruments with respect to
revenue is as follows Πfe(α¯∗) > Πca > Πfc(b¯∗) > Πeq.
In the succeeding section we will formally introduce the instruments, charac-
terize the equilibrium bidding strategies, and obtain seller’s expected revenue.
4.2.1 Fixed-Equity Hybrid
In the fixed-equity hybrid, seller fixes the equity α¯ the winner of the auction has
to pay over the return of the project. Knowing this information buyers compete in
cash for the allocation of the project. Thus, winner’s payment to the seller consists
of the lowest bid in cash, plus the fixed-equity fraction over projects’ return.
Proposition 5. The dominant-strategy equilibrium of the second price auction
under a fixed-equity hybrid is characterized as follows:
i) If (1− α¯)v1 − c < 0, then b1 = b2 = 0.
ii) If (1 − α¯)v1 − c > 0 and (1 − α¯)v2 − c < 0, then b1 = (1 − α¯)v1 − c and
b2 = −e.
iii) If (1− α¯)v2 − c ≥ 0, then b1 = (1− α¯)v1 − c− e and b2 = (1− α¯)v2 − c− e.
Proof. In case i) the project is not profitable to implement for any of the buyers,
and thus, their best strategy is to submit a bid of zero. On the other hand, in case
ii) the project is profitable to implement for buyer 1 but not for buyer 2; hence,
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the best strategy for buyer 1 is to bid his reservation value, and implement the
project if he is allocated. Given buyer 1’s strategy, the best response of buyer 2 is
to bid his reservation value, which in this case is the negative externality he knows
will suffer if buyer 1 wins the auction. Finally, if the project is profitable for both
bidders, both will bid their reservation value, which includes the avoidance of the
externality.
There are several interesting observations that can be highlighted from propo-
sition 5. First, the likelihood of allocations and payments are not necessarily
weakly increasing in buyer’s type. For instance, if buyer 2 -the one with the low-
est valuation- bids the absolute value of the externality, wins the auction, and pays
the reservation value of buyer 1. Moreover, if both buyers find profitable to im-
plement the project, there cannot be an equilibrium in which buyer 2 implements
the project, and therefore, his incentives to participate in the auction reside in
avoiding the externality if he can win the auction at a price lower than the value
of the externality e.
Figure 4.2 shows the bidding strategy of bidder 1 as a function of the valuation
of bidder 2, given that v1 > c1−α¯ , and thus when only cases ii) and iii) are possible.
10
It can be observed from figure 4.2 that as soon as the project becomes profitable
for buyer 2 (i.e. when v2 ≥ c1−α) buyer 1 increases his bid by −e, to reflect the
fact that he would suffer the externality in case he loses the auction.
The expected revenue generated by the fixed-equity hybrid under these equi-
librium strategies correspond to
10If v1 < c1−α¯ then he will bid b1(v1) = 0 when v2 <
c
1−α¯ , otherwise b1(v1) = −e.
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v2
b1(v2)
10 c1−α¯
b′1(v2)
b′′1(v2)
−e
(1− α¯)(v′′1 − v′1)
Figure 4.2: Bidding strategies with fixed-equity for buyer 1
Πfe(α¯) = 2F ( c1− α¯)
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
((1− α¯)v1 − c)f(v1)dv1 (4.1)
+ 2F ( c1− α¯)
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)f(v1)dv1
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
[(1− α¯) min{v1, v2} − c− e+ α¯max{v1, v2}]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
First, notice that if the project is not profitable for any buyer, the auction will
generate zero revenue. In the case it is profitable for buyer 1 but not for buyer
2, we need to identify two sub-cases: one when 0 < (1 − α¯)v1 − c < −e, and the
other one when −e < (1− α¯)v1 − c. In the former, buyer 2 wins the auction but
does not implement the project, therefore the seller does not collect revenue from
the equity portion of the hybrid, but will get a transfer of (1 − α¯)v1 − c, which
is the lowest bid in cash. This case corresponds to the first term in equation (1).
Now, in the other case, buyer 1 will win and implement the project, which means
the seller will collect a contingent revenue of α¯v1 plus a transfer in cash of −e.
This corresponds to the second term. Finally, when both buyers find profitable
to implement the project, the seller collects the lowest reservation value in cash,
98
plus the fraction of equity corresponding to the highest type. This is precisely the
third term.
4.2.2 Fixed-Cash Hybrid
When the seller uses a fixed-cash hybrid he fixes the amount in cash the winner
of the auction has to pay, b¯. Knowing this information, bidders compete in equity
for the allocation of the project, and it is allocated to the buyer with the highest
bid in equity. Therefore, winner’s final payment to the seller corresponds to the
lowest bid in equity, times the return of the project when it is implemented by
him, plus the fixed-amount in cash.
Proposition 6. The Nash Equilibrium of the second price auction under a fixed-
cash hybrid is characterized as follows:
i) If v1 − c− b¯ < 0; then b1 = b2 = 0.
ii,a) If v1 − c− b¯ > 0 and −b¯ ≤ e; then b1 = v1−c−b¯v1 and b2 = 0.
ii,b) If v1 − c− b¯ > 0 and −b¯ > e; then b1 = v1−c−b¯v1 and b2 = (v1−c−b¯v1 , 1].
Proof. In the first case the project is not profitable for any of the buyers and then
no one will suffer the externality in case the project is allocated to his opponent.
Moreover, bidding a positive equity will give the buyers a positive probability of
winning the auction, which will force them to pay the amount b¯ to the seller.
Therefore, the best strategy for both buyers is to stay out of the auction. If the
project is profitable for buyer 1 but not for buyer 2, and the fixed amount of cash
b¯ is higher or equal to the value of avoiding the externality −e, buyer 2 prefers to
stay out of the auction and suffer the externality. On the other hand, if −b¯ > e,
buyer 2 has an incentive to participate in the auction to bid high enough in order
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to destroy the incentives of buyer 1 to implement the project in case he wins the
auction. In both cases, the best response of buyer 1 is to bid his reservation value,
which does not take into account the avoidance of the externality, because he
knows buyer 2 never will implement the project if he has the opportunity to do
so. Finally if the project is profitable for both, there is no equilibrium in which
buyer 2 wins the auction and implements the project. The reason is that as the
reservation value of buyer 2 is lower than the one of buyer 1, if buyer 1 is not the
winner then there is a profitable deviation in which he offers a slightly higher bid
than buyer 2, wins the auction, and avoid the negative externality. Given that
situation, the best response for buyer 2 is to bid 0 if −b¯ ≤ e, or otherwise bid high
enough to destroy the incentive of buyer 1 to implement the project in case he
wins the project. Following the strategy of buyer 2, the best strategy for buyer 1
is to submit his reservation value.
Equity represents the particular case in which b¯ = 0. In this case implementa-
tion never takes place and blocking is always the best response of the weak buyer.
Notice that this is true for any e < 0 and moreover this is one of the possible
equilibrium for e = 0, being this equilibrium particularly robust. In figure 4.3 we
present the bidding strategy of bidder 1 as a function of the valuation of bidder
2, given that it is profitable for him to implement (i.e. when v1 > c+ b¯). In other
words, we restrict attention to cases ii,a) and ii,b. 11
Figure 4.3 shows that as v1 increases b1(v1, ·) increases as well (v′′1 > v′1), which
implies that the region of parameters under which buyer 1 just block the allocation
decreases. 12
11If v1 < c + b¯ then he will bid b1(v1) = 0 when v2 < c + b¯ or b¯ > −e, otherwise he will bid
anything between 1 and the reservation value of buyer 2.
12Under v′1 he will block the allocation at the dashed plus dotted region whereas under v′′1 he
will block only at the dotted region.
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b1(v2)
1− c− b¯
1
10 c+ b¯ v′1 v′′1
b′1(v2)
b′′1(v2)
Figure 4.3: Bidding strategies with fixed-cash for buyer 1
The revenue generated by these equilibrium strategies corresponds to
Πfc(b¯) = (1− F (c+ b¯)2)b¯ (4.2)
It states that the seller will collect the fixed amount of cash b¯ as long as at least
one of the buyers find profitable to implement the project. The clear tradeoff for
the seller is that increasing b¯ diminishes the probability of implementation, but
increases the surplus extracted conditional on implementation.
Once we considered the expected revenues of both instruments given by ex-
pressions (4.1) and (4.2), the natural following step is to determine how do they
rank. This is precisely the matter of the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any log-concave density f , there exists a cutoff values c¯ and e,
such that if c ∈ (0, c¯) and e < e the instruments can be ranked in expected revenue
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as follows:
Πfe(α¯∗) > Πfe(0) > Πfc(b¯∗) > Πfc(0) (4.3)
Theorem 3 states that if the cost of the project and the negative externality
are sufficiently low, the seller is globally better off using a fixed-equity hybrid.
The reason of this result is that, as we discussed before, when payments are made
upfront in cash buyers have to face a sunk cost if they want to block the imple-
mentation of his opponent. Therefore, the willingness of a “bad type” to pay is
bounded above by the absolute value of the negative externality. If the externality
is so large that the bad type wins the auction, the seller secures for himself the
reservation value of the highest type; otherwise, he receives the fixed equity from
the good type, plus the value of the externality in cash. On the other hand, when
buyers can bid in equity they can destroy more often the equilibrium in which
the project is implemented. The effect is particularly dramatic when the seller
uses a pure security, because blocking can be done at no cost. This problem can
be mitigated by incorporating a fixed cash component b¯; however as the theorem
shows, its presence is not sufficient to offset the perverse incentives of the “bad
type” buyers. The result holds for any log concave density, which suggests that the
interaction between buyers is strong enough to hold under different distributional
assumptions.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the result of theorem 3 when valuations are drawn inde-
pendently and identically from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1], with a
negative externality of e = −0.2 and a cost of c = 0.1. As it can be seen, there
is a large range for the parameter α¯ such that the fixed-equity hybrid renders a
higher revenue than cash, which in turn yields a higher revenue than the fixed-
cash hybrid. Noticeably, the revenue obtained by cash is 50% higher than the one
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Figure 4.4: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for U [0, 1]
yielded by the optimal fixed-cash hybrid. 13
Monotone Comparative Statics Now we will inspect what happens to the
optimal fixed parameters b¯∗ and α¯∗ when the distribution improves in the sense
of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio property. This analysis will provide an insight
of how different distributions affect the design of both hybrids
Theorem 4. Suppose f1 dominates f0 in the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR),
then b¯∗1 ≥ b¯∗0. If additionally, F1(y)F0(y) >
f1(y)
f0(y) for all y ∈ [c, v¯], then α¯∗1 ≥ α¯∗1
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorem 4 says that for a fixed cost and an externality, if the likelihood of
getting higher values improve in the sense of MLR, the optimal fixed cash amount
in its respective hybrid cannot decrease. If in addition the ratio of the densities is
majorized by the ratio of the distributions for all values greater than the cost, the
optimal fixed equity portion in its respective hybrid cannot decrease. It implies
that when the seller is using the fixed-equity hybrid he will apply a higher equity
portion over a higher expected return of the project. Likewise, when the seller
uses a fixed-cash hybrid, it means that now the barrier a bad type has to surpass
13Similar figures for different distributions are presented in the appendix.
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to enter the auction and block implementation is higher. Naturally, in both cases
expected seller’s revenue increases.
4.2.3 Other Variations
Deposit Insurance Notice that depending on the security design, the seller
can collect a payment from buyers in two stages: after a buyer wins the auction,
and after a winner implements the project. As mentioned before, the idea of
introducing a payment in cash was a device to screen the low type buyers who
otherwise would always have an incentive to enter into the auction to destroy
the implementation incentives of the high type buyers. In particular, the fixed-
cash hybrid forces the winner to make a payment in cash right after winning the
auction. A variant of this instrument, is to introduce a cash deposit (or insurance).
This device would work as follows. The seller fixes an amount each buyer has to
deposit to participate in the auction. Then, a second price auction in equity is
run. The loser gets the deposit back. If the winner implements the project, he has
to pay the correspondent equity over project’s return but the seller gives back the
cash deposit. On the other hand, if the winner does not implement the project
the seller retains the cash deposit. 14 Although the cash transfer is determined
in a different stage, it can be shown that bidding strategies are the same as in
the fixed-cash hybrid, and therefore the revenue for the seller does not change.
In other words: If the cash deposit is below −e then the “bad type” will block
implementation, otherwise his bid will be zero thus revenue is the same as in the
fixed-cash hybrid.
14Another way of doing the same is by fixing the size of the deposit the winner should pay
upon winning the auction (only the winner pays) and he can claim it back upon implementation.
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Unconstrained Bids The two hybrids presented before share the characteristic
that the seller determines ex-ante the bid in one of the securities. For instance,
in the fixed-equity hybrid, the seller fixes the fraction of equity asked but let
buyers to compete in cash. Meanwhile, in the fixed-cash hybrid, the seller fixes
the possible bids of cash but let buyers to compete in equity. Alternatively, one
can think in a format where the seller decides to run a second price auction but
without imposing any restriction on buyers’ bids. Thus, each player bid consists
on a tuple bi = (αi, βi) ∈ R × [0, 1], where αi represents the equity promised on
the return of the project and βi corresponds to an upfront payment in cash. The
critical difference of this approach with respect to the former is that now there is
no trivial way to rank bids and determine the winner of the auction. Suppose the
seller uses an order ψ such that (R× [0, 1], ψ) constitutes a linearly ordered set.
Proposition 7. Fix an arbitrary ψ. The dominant strategy equilibrium of the
second price auction under unconstrained bids corresponds to: b1 = (0, v1 − c− e)
if v1 − c > 0 and b1 = (1, 0) otherwise; b2 = (1, 0).
Proof. If the project is not profitable for buyer 2 his dominant strategy is to bid
the whole equity and nothing in cash. Following this strategy, he makes sure the
project is never implemented at no cost, and so, he never suffers the externality.
When the project is profitable for both, bidder 1 offers his reservation value in the
cheapest way, which involves only cash, as he is the highest type and any marginal
fraction he bids in equity is only valued by the seller with respect to the expected
type. Given this strategy, bidder 2 offers the whole equity and no cash, to block
the allocation in which buyer 1 wins the auction and implements the project.
Notice that this equilibrium is obtained irrespectively of the order ψ the seller
uses to rank the bids. The result follows because equity is the instrument that
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permits to avoid the externality without paying any cost. This is the worst case
scenario for the seller, as the revenue under unconstrained bids is Πub = 0. The
critical assumption is that the auction is a second price, because the buyer is
forced to pay each component of his opponent bid.
4.3 Robustness: Private Buyer’s Valuations
In this section we will analyze the set of securities under the assumption that
buyers do not longer know the valuation of his opponent, which turns our model
into a standard private values auction model. We will analyze how the information
structure affects our main result.
4.3.1 Fixed-Equity Hybrid
Analogously to section 4.2.1 we characterize the equilibrium under private
information. We use the Bayes-Nash equilibrium as the solution concept.
Proposition 8. Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies of the second price auc-
tion when the seller uses fixed-equity, α¯, are characterized by
i) bi(vi) = 0 if (1− α¯)vi − c < 0.
ii) bi(vi) = (1− α¯)vi − c+ (1− F ( c1−α¯))(−e) if (1− α¯)vi − c > 0.
Proof. As the seller utilizes a second price auction, and buyers bid in cash, the best
strategy for a buyer who finds profitable to implement the project is to bid their
reservation value. Now, buyer i’s reservation value depends on the implementation
decision of his opponent. Thus, with probability F ( c1−α¯) it is not profitable for
the other buyer to implement the project, and so buyer i’s reservation value is
equal to the net payoff of implementing the project: (1 − α¯)vi − c. On the other
hand, with probability 1−F ( c1−α¯) it is profitable for the other buyer to implement
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the project, which implies that in case buyer i loses the auction he will suffer the
externality e, and thus, such expected loss has to be added to his bid. For the
buyer who does not want to implement the project his reservation value is given
by 1− F ( c1−α¯)(−e). If he bids his reservation value, he will lose with probability
one if he faces an opponent who wants to implement the project. In such case his
payment will be e. On the other hand, when he faces an opponent who does not
want to implement the project neither, his expected payoff will be 12(1−F ( c1−α¯))(e).
Hence, there is clearly a profitable deviation to zero. By doing this the buyer will
continue losing the auction when facing an opponent who wants to implement the
project, and then will obtain the same payoff, but now will obtain a zero payoff if
he faces an opponent who does not want to implement.
Following the same reasoning as with the public case, seller’s ex-ante revenue
is given by
Πfe(α¯) = 2F ( c1− α¯ )
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1)f(v1)dv1
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
[(1− α¯) min{v1, v2} − c+ (1− F ( c1− α¯ ))(−e) + α¯max{v1, v2}]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
The first term in the integral corresponds to the case when one buyer finds
profitable to implement the project and the other does not. In this scenario, the
seller collects the fixed equity portion from the highest type and receives zero in
cash. Meanwhile, the second term represents the expected revenue when both
buyers want to implement the project. Here the seller receives the equity portion
from the highest type, plus the cash embedded in the lowest bid.
4.3.2 Fixed-Cash Hybrid
In a similar fashion to section 4.2.2 we characterize the equilibrium under
private information. We show that the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies depends on the relationship between the fixed amount of cash b¯
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and the value of the externality e.
Proposition 9. There are no equilibria in pure strategies in the fixed-cash hybrid
if:
i) −b¯ > e and (1− F (c+ b¯))e < −b¯.
ii) −b¯ > e and (1− F (c+ b¯))e > −b¯.
Proof. The problem to reach an equilibrium on case (i) resides in the optimal
strategy of the buyer’s type who does not want to implement the project: the “bad
type.” If both buyers of such type bid zero, any of them would find profitable to
deviate and bid the smallest amount that guarantees him to be the winner of the
auction. In such case the deviant buyer would get a payoff of −b¯ which is greater
than (1 − F (c + b¯))e. For the same reason, the other buyer also deviates to the
same bid, which yields a payoff of F (c+ b¯)(− b¯2)(1−F (c+ b¯))(−b¯) to both buyers.
Notice that in such situation both buyers block the implementation with certainty
and share the cost. Nonetheless, as soon as both buyers bid the same amount,
any of them -say buyer i- has an incentive to bid an arbitrarily lower amount. It
guarantees to suffer the externality with a very low probability in case he faces
the good type of buyer −i, but saves his portion of the fixed amount of cash when
faces his fellow bad type. The moment buyer i deviates, buyer −i has two possible
deviations, either to bid lower than buyer i, or returning to the initial bid. The
former deviation is more profitable. Continuing with this analysis, some buyer
will reach a level at which there is no downward deviation for his rival. That is,
a point where if his opponent submits a lower bid, he will suffer a payoff lower
than −b¯. Or in other words, a bid k ∈ (0, 1) such that F (b−1(k))(e) = b¯. Under
this scenario, if buyer i bids k, the best deviation for buyer −i is to return to
the initial bid, which will start again the cycle of deviations. In order to prove
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case (ii) it is worth noting that “bad buyers” will make a bid of zero. Now the
problem resides on the “good buyers”. Consider the type vi = c + b¯. If he bids
bi(vi) = vi−c−b¯vi he wins against all the types that do now want to implement the
project getting a payoff of zero but loses against all the other types that want
to implement the project (it is clear that no bidder who wants to implement the
project has incentives to bid below his reservation value without considering the
externality). Whenever he loses, he gets e for sure (he only loses against types that
are willing to implement at his reservation value) which is worse than paying b¯ and
not implementing. Hence, he is better off blocking every possible implementation:
bidding the smallest amount that guarantees him to be the winner of the auction.
Sufficiently many types will deviate to this bid as long as −b¯ > e, because they
can block potential implementation. At this point the cyclical logic of case (i)
comes into place, not for the “bad types” now but for the “good types”, and no
equilibrium is reached in pure strategies.
Proposition 10. Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding strategies of the second price
auction under the fixed-cash hybrid, when −b¯ ≤ e, are characterized by
i) bi(vi) = vi−c−b¯vi , if vi − c− b¯ > 0.
ii) bi(vi) = 0 if vi − c− b¯ < 0.
Proof. In case (ii) the project is not profitable for the buyer, and moreover, the
negative externality e is lower than the loss he would get by winning the auc-
tion and not implementing the project, −b¯. As there is no way to prevent the
implementation of the project by his competitor without winning the auction,
the best strategy of the “bad type” is to bid zero in equity. In case (i), the
buyer finds profitable to implement the project, and his best strategy is to bid his
reservation value -which does not depends on the implementation decision of his
109
opponent. If bi(vi) > vi−c−b¯vi he will win whenever bi(vi) > b−i(v−i) but there are
two different situations. When b−i(v−i) < vi−c−b¯vi buyer i will win the auction and
implement the project, guaranteeing for himself a payoff of at least zero. When
bi(vi) > b−i(v−i) > vi−c−b¯vi buyer i will win the auction but cannot implement the
project, thus his payoff is −b¯. By deviating to bi(vi) = vi−c−b¯vi he keeps the positive
payoffs (wins and implements in all the cases he wants to do so) and at most
suffers a payoff of e upon losing which is better than −b¯.
Once we have derived the equilibrium strategies we can state the expression
for seller’s expected revenue. Given we have equilibrium whenever −b¯ < e we can
state the revenue just for this particular case.
Πfc(b¯) = 2(1− F (c+ b¯))F (c+ b¯)b¯
+
∫ v¯
c+b¯
∫ b¯
c+b¯
(min{v1 − c− b¯
v1
,
v2 − c− b¯
v2
}max{v1, v2}+ b¯)f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
4.3.3 Equity
To analyze equity, we cannot simply take bidding strategies as particular cases
of the fixed-cash hybrid, because now even for very low valuations the buyer can
bid sufficiently high, and still avoid a positive payment to the seller.
Proposition 11. Equilibrium bidding strategy when the seller uses equity is uniquely
characterized by bi(vi) = 1.
Proof. Clearly, if vi − c < 0 buyer i will not implement the project if he wins, so
winning the project only has value as long as it prevents the other agent to win and
implement the project, because in this case buyer i avoids the negative externality
it would entail. Now if vi − c > 0, in principle buyer i optimal strategy is to
bid his reservation value, as now he has the normal trade-off any buyer faces in
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an auction: increasing the bid increases the probability of winning but decreases
the surplus. However, the presence of the externality biases buyer’s incentives
towards winning the auction. In concrete, if vi− c > 0 but small, the buyer might
be better off by bidding one in equity and avoiding the externality with certainty,
than gambling on winning the auction and suffering the externality with positive
probability.
vi
bi(vi)
1− c− b¯− e
1
10 v˜
Figure 4.5: Threshold equilibrium under Equity
This behavior may give room for the possibility of having a cut-off strategy. If
this were the case, there would exist a value v˜ such that if vi < v˜ then bi(vi) = 1 and
if vi ≥ v˜ then buyers bid their reservation value -which includes the externality
he would suffer in case of his opponent implements the project. In such case
the strategy of buyer i would have a discontinuity at v˜, as shown in figure 4.5.
However, if it were the case, at v˜ the bid of the agent will be the lowest possible,
which implies he loses the auction for sure and will suffer the externality with
positive probability. Thus, bidding one is a profitable deviation. This observation
holds for any value v˜ < 1. Therefore, both agents will bid one in equilibrium and
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the project is never implemented.
4.3.4 Example Revisited
Following the example presented in section 4.2 we show the values of α¯∗, Πfe, b¯∗,
Πfc, Πca and Πeq for different distributions of types when the cost of implementing
the project is c = 0.1 and the externality is e = −0.2.
Table 4.2: Seller expected revenue under optimal securities: Private Info
Expected Seller Revenue
Distribution α¯∗ b¯∗ Πfe(α¯∗) Πca Πfc(b¯∗) Πeq
U [0, 1] 0.67 0.42 0.54 0.39 0.35 0
B[2, 2] 0.58 0.32 0.55 0.45 0.34 0
B[2, 7] 0.23 ∗∗ 0.18 0.17 ∗∗ 0
IB[2, 7] 0.75 0.2 0.91 0.80 0.68 0
**: b¯ is in the no equilibrium range
Even though the table computes Πfc only for the case where we have an equi-
librium in pure strategies, our results are robust: Most of the entries on table 4.2
are similar to the ones presented on table 4.1. The only difference is b¯ for the
IB[2, 7] because now the seller can force bidders to bid in equity without consid-
ering the externality and he seems willing to do so. 15 However the payoff he
obtains is similar to the case of public information.
150.2 is the α¯∗ that maximizes revenue on α¯∗ ∈ [0.2, 1] but it is still possible (although unlikely)
that α¯∗ < 0.2.
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4.4 Concluding Remarks
We analyzed a simple two-buyer second price auction, where the seller can
use two different hybrids and the buyers suffer negative externalities upon the
implementation of the project by their opponent. In particular, we consider a
fixed-equity hybrid, where the seller fixes a portion of equity over project’s return
and buyers compete in cash; and a fixed-cash hybrid, where the buyers compete in
equity and the winner has to pay an amount in cash predetermined by the seller.
Our main observation lies in the fact that pure securities equip low-valuation
buyers (those who do not want to implement the project, or bad types) with a
powerful tool to block the implementation from the good types, which impacts
revenue negatively. Then, we find that in order to circumvent this problem the
seller has to incorporate a fixed payment in the instruments to be used as a device
to prevent “bad types” from blocking. However, mitigating this adverse selection
problem poses a tradeoff on the seller: by increasing the fixed portion of the
hybrid utilized, the project becomes less profitable for buyers, and thus, induces
less participation.
The fixed-equity hybrid conducts the screening in cash, whereas the fixed-cash
hybrid conducts the screening in equity. If the seller decides to use the latter,
buyers retain the power of blocking the implementation, conditional on the fact
that they decide to participate in the auction -which now depends on the fixed-
amount of cash requested by seller to the winners. On the other hand, when the
seller uses the former, the screening is realized in cash, which is the cheapest way
“good types” can use to distinguish themselves. Therefore, the screening realized
is more effective, and the seller ends up trading with the good types more often.
This is the intuition that justifies the preeminence of the fixed-equity hybrid as
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the best instrument in the menu. At the same time, that is the reason why equity
is the worst. More surprisingly is the result that the optimal fixed-cash hybrid
performs worse than cash, if the value of the externality is sufficiently high (in
absolute value). However, it reflects the fact that when buyers want to avoid a
sufficiently high negative externality, their willingness to pay upfront more than
offsets the potential extraction through equity.
An interesting feature of our result is that it seems to be robust to the structure
of the information. That is, even when buyer’s valuations are private information,
the fixed-equity hybrid continues to be the best, and equity continues to be the
worst. However, the fixed-equity instrument now does not always have an equi-
librium in pure strategies, which increases the uncertainty over seller’s revenue in
the more general case.
Finally, we analyze what would happen to the optimal fixed-payment portion
in both hybrids when the distribution improves in the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
property. Intuitively, we obtain that the amount of cash in the fixed-cash hybrid
is non-decreasing, and that under some condition of the distributions, the equity
portion in the fixed-equity hybrid is also non-decreasing. These results state that
when buyers draw better valuations, the seller is less concerned about inducing
participation, and can extract a higher surplus from the winner of the auction.
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APPENDIX A - ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM AS A GAME OF
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
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Assuming that the only piece of information students have at the time to
make their decision is their preferences and scores, they are engaged in a game of
incomplete information in which the ulterior objective is to maximize the expected
utility derived of their major assigned in equilibrium. The space of actions of
this game is Mk -the set of k-tuples defined over the set of majors- and so, a
strategy σ for each student is a mapping σ : [x, x]S × U → ∆(Mk), where ∆(Mk)
denotes the set of probability distributions overMk. Alternatively, we can express
any mixed strategy as a randomization over the set of pure strategies. That is,
letting B be the space of functions β : [x, x] × U → Mk, a mixed strategy σ
corresponds to a probability distribution of ∆(B). Moreover, for a profile of mixed
strategies (σ1, · · · , σS) ∈ ∆(B)S, the density assigned by the mixed strategy σs to
the pure strategy βs is given by λσs(βs). Then, for any profile of pure strategies
β = (β1, · · · , βS), λσ(β) = ∏Ss=1 λσs(βs) denotes the density of playing the pure
strategy (β1, · · · , βS) under the mixed strategy σ.
Hence, when the profile of mixed strategies (σs,σ−s) is played, the expected
utility of student s under the mechanism φ, corresponds to:
EUs(σ) =
∫
BS
(∫
US
∫
[x,x]M
u(φs(β(x,u))h(u,x)d(u,x)
)
λσ(β)dβ (4)
When students are not allowed to report a complete order over majors the
mechanism is not strategy proof. Hence, it is not possible to use a dominant
strategies equilibrium as a solution concept; instead, we rely on the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in un-dominated strategies to solve the game. However, not
even the equilibrium can be guaranteed since the space of preferences and scores
is a continuum, and therefore it could be the case that (4) is not well defined.
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APPENDIX B - DATA ANALYSIS
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Table 3: Assigned Seats in Each Area by High School Type and Sex
High school type Gender
Academic Area Private Public Male Female Total
Arts 44 57 39 62 101
Literature 202 236 167 271 438
Hard Sciences 195 284 282 197 479
Education 195 447 211 431 642
Economics Sciences 441 491 512 420 932
Social Sciences 378 424 353 449 802
Engineering 499 510 724 285 1,009
Health 285 269 200 354 554
Agroalimentary Sciences 115 140 141 114 255
Total 2,354 2,858 2,629 2,583 5,212
(%) 45.2% 54.8% 50.4% 49.6%
Table 3 shows the distribution by gender and high school type among the
different academic areas. There are not remarkable differences at the aggregate
level between public and private high schools, since approximately 50% and 55% of
the student body are male and from public schools, respectively. However, within
areas it is possible to observe a pattern of this sort in education and engineering.
In the former, 67% are women, while in the latter 71% are men. Education also
presents a bias towards public high schools, with a representation over 69%.
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Table 4: Students who Accepted Admission at their Second Option
Group Total Percentage
Arts 8 8%
Literature 191 42%
Hard Sciences 206 43%
Education 316 47%
Economics Sciences 392 37%
Social Sciences 325 38%
Engineering 250 23%
Health 194 35%
Agro alimentary Sciences 135 45%
Third column presents the percentage of students who where admitted, and
consolidated their enrollment, at a major that was ranked second in their submit-
ted report to the RO.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Scores for Students who Applied for Admission.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the admission scores for those students
were admitted and for those who applied but were not admitted. As expected,
the distribution of students who were not admitted is skewed to the left. One
interesting aspect is that there is a non-negligible mass to the right of 600 under
the non-admitted curve, and to the left of 500 under the admitted curve. The
former group is the students who probably took “too much risk” and the latter
is the group of played a protective strategy at the time to report his options to
the RO. The figure presents clear evidence that the restriction in the number of
options affects the caliber of the students admitted.
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APPENDIX C - SIMULATION RESULTS
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Figure 7: Distribution of Students in Tiers.
This figure shows the distribution of students in each of the tiers constructed
from the maximum threshold scores. The reports of the students in the first
tier are used as the commencement of the preference profiles. The frequency of
students in the last tiers increase since we use the historical maximum scores to
construct the tiers.
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Figure 8: Ranking of the Assignments with respect to Students’ Preferences.
The figure shows the fraction of cases of “justified envy” with respect to the
total of possible pairwise comparisons. For example, taking the student with the
highest score, we analyze if he envies the allocation of the student with second
highest score, the third highest score, and so on, until to the student with the
lowest score. Then, we repeat the process for all students. All possible comparisons
conform the total of possible pairwise comparisons.
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Figure 9: Ranking of the Assignments with respect to Students’ Preferences.
This figure shows the distribution of the assignment with respect to students’
true preferences, as a function of the number of options to report.
129
T
he
fig
ur
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
sim
ul
at
ed
th
re
sh
ol
d
an
d
di
ffe
re
nt
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s.
Ex
ce
pt
fo
r
th
e
m
aj
or
s
in
A
rt
s
an
d
Li
te
ra
tu
re
s
-t
he
on
es
w
ith
lo
we
r
in
de
x
in
th
e
gr
ap
h-
w
hi
ch
ar
e
le
ss
st
ab
le
du
e
to
th
e
ex
tr
a
ab
ili
ty
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
,f
or
th
e
re
st
of
th
e
m
aj
or
s
th
e
fit
is
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
y.
T
hi
s
fe
at
ur
e
is
a
m
ea
su
re
of
th
e
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
of
th
e
al
go
rit
hm
,s
in
ce
th
is
m
ea
su
re
of
th
e
ad
m
iss
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
wa
s
no
t
ta
rg
et
ed
by
th
e
al
go
rit
hm
.
130
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
M
ajo
r
40
0
45
0
50
0
55
0
60
0
65
0
70
0
75
0
Confidence Interval and Thresholds
0.
99
0.
95
0.
9
Si
m
ul
at
ed
 T
hr
es
ho
ld
Fi
gu
re
10
:
C
on
fid
en
ce
In
te
rv
al
of
th
e
T
hr
es
ho
ld
Sc
or
es
.
131
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Major
0
50
100
150
200
Ab
so
lu
te
 E
xc
es
s 
De
m
an
d
(a) Absolute Excess Demand: Mean
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(e) Absolute Excess Demand: Maximum
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Figure 11: Excess Demand in the PSU Mechanism for Selected Threshold Scores
This panel shows the excess demand in the different majors when the planner
announces three different configurations of the thresholds scores. In particular,
figure 11a shows the absoulte excess demand when the planner announces the
mean of the past threshold scores in each major. Likewise, figure 11b shows the
excess demand relative to the number of seats offered in each major. Figures 11c
to 11f do the same when the planner announces the median and the maximum of
the past threshold scores.
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APPENDIX D - OMITTED PROOFS
134
Proof of Theorem 3. We will prove the theorem following three steps. First we
will prove that the optimal fixed-equity hybrid involves a portion of equity α¯∗ ∈
(0, 1), which immediately implies that the hybrid dominates pure cash in revenue.
Analogously, in the second step we will show that the optimal fixed-cash hybrid
involves a positive amount of cash (i.e. b¯∗ > 0), which in turn implies that it
dominates pure equity in revenue. Finally, we will prove that the revenue under
cash is higher than the revenue under the optimal fixed-cash hybrid.
Step 1 We take first order conditions by applying Leibniz’ rule to the three
different terms in (4.1). First derivative D1(α¯, c, e) corresponds to:
2F ( c1− α¯)[
(c− e)e
(1− α¯)2f(
c− e
(1− α¯))−
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
v1f(v1)dv1]−2f( c1− α¯)
c
(1− α¯)2
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
((1−α¯)v1−c)f(v1)dv1
Likewise, second derivative D2(α¯, c, e) is given by
2F ( c1− α¯)[
(α¯c− e)
1− α¯
(c− e)
(1− α¯)2f(
c− e
(1− α¯))+
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
v1f(v1)dv1]−2f( c1− α¯)
c
(1− α¯)2
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1−e)f(v1)dv1
Finally, applying Leibniz rule twice in the third term and using the fact
that valuations are independently and identically distributed, the third deriva-
tive D3(α¯, c, e) becomes:
2[
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1−e)f(v1)dv1] c(1− α¯)2f(
c
1− α¯)+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(max{v1, v2}−min{v1, v2})f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
Letting D˜(α, c, e) = D1(α, c, e) +D2(α, c, e) +D3(α, c, e) we have that
D˜(0, c, e) = 2F (c)[
∫ v¯
c−e
v1f(v1)dv1 −
∫ c−e
c
v1f(v1)dv1]
− 2f(c)c[
∫ c−e
c
(v1 − c)f(v1)dv1]− e(1− 2F (c) + F (c− e))]
+
∫ v¯
c
∫ v¯
c
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
Now, we will explore the behavior of the first order condition when the cost
tends to zero.
lim
c↓0
D˜(0, c, e) =
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2 > 0 ∀e < 0
Notice that for a given e, as D˜(0, c, e)) is continuous, there exists a cut-off in
the cost
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c¯1 := sup{c˜ > 0 : D˜(0, c, e) > 0 for all c ∈ (0, c˜)}
Moreover,
lim
α¯→1 Π
fe(α¯) = 0
and,
Πfe(0) = 2F (c)[
∫ c−e
c
(v − c)f(v)dv +
∫ v¯
c−e
(−e)f(v)dv]
+
∫ v¯
c
∫ v¯
c
(min{v1, v2} − c− e)f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2 > 0
Therefore, because revenue is strictly increasing at α¯ = 0 and Πfe(0) > Πfe(1)
for all e, the optimal fraction of equity α¯∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Step 2 Now we will prove that the optimal portion of cash in the fixed-cash
hybrid is positive. That is, b¯∗ > 0.
Taking first order conditions of (4.2) with respect to b¯ we have that
b¯∗ = 1− F (c+ b¯
∗)
f(c+ b¯∗)
1 + F (c+ b¯∗)
2F (c+ b¯∗)
= 1
λ(c+ b¯∗)
1 + F (c+ b¯∗)
2F (c+ b¯∗)
(5)
where λ(·) is the hazard ratio associated with f .
Now, as the density f is log-concave, by theorem 3 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005) the hazard rate λ of F is an increasing function. Therefore, the second
derivative of (4.2) is negative for all b¯, and the expression in (5) corresponds to its
unique global solution. Intuitively, if the seller raises marginally the fixed amount
b¯, his revenue increases by this amount only with probability 1− F (c+ b¯), which
is the likelihood that the project is profitable for a particular buyer. On the other
hand, f(b¯), measures the loss in implementation the seller will cause by rising
the fixed amount of cash requested. That is, the seller will gain the marginal
amount in the cash requested except in those cases where the winner was already
indifferent between implementing or not the project. In those cases, if the seller
raises b¯ now the project is not profitable for the winner, and the seller will reduce
participation. This expression is scaled by the factor at the right.
Step 3 In the last step we will show that the revenue under cash is higher than
the revenue under the optimal fixed-cash hybrid.
Let b¯∗ be the optimal fixed-cash amount when the cost is zero, and thus b¯∗ =
1−F (b¯∗)
f(b¯∗)
1+F (b¯∗)
2F (b¯∗) . Hence,
lim
c↓0
Πfe(0, c, e) = −e+
∫ v¯
0
∫ v¯
0
min{v1, v2}f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
> −e+
∫ v¯
b¯∗
∫ v¯
b¯∗
min{v1, v2}f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
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That is, when the cost approaches to zero from above, the expected revenue
when the seller uses cash is higher than the expected revenue under the best
fixed-cash hybrid.
Now, fix c ∈ (c, c¯). Using the expressions of revenue for fixed-equity (4.1) and
fixed-cash (4.2) hybrids, we need to show that
Πfe(0, c, e) = 2F (c)[
∫ c−e
c
(v1 − c)f(v1)dv1 +
∫ v¯
c−e
(−e)f(v1)dv1]
+
∫ v¯
c
∫ v¯
c
[min{v1, v2} − c− e]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
is greater than
Πfc(b¯∗, c, e) = 2
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
b¯∗f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
+
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
b¯∗f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
Or rearranging terms, we need that
2F (c)[
∫ c−e
c
(v1 − c)f(v1)dv1 +
∫ v¯
c−e
(−e)f(v1)dv1] + (1− F (c))2(−c− e)
+
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
∫ v¯
c+b¯∗(c)
[min{v1, v2} − b¯∗(c)]f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
min{v1, v2}f(v1)f(v2)dv1dv2
be greater than
(1− F (c+ b¯∗(c))2)
f(c+ b¯∗(c))
(1 + F (c+ b¯∗(c)))
where the last expression is obtained by replacing the functional form of b¯∗(c).
Hence, to show that Πfe(0) > Πfc(b¯∗(c)) is sufficient that
−e > 1 + F (c+ b¯
∗(c))
f(c+ b¯∗(c))
+ c− 2(1− F (c))2
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
(1− F (v1))f(v1)v1dv1
Therefore we can define
−e = arg max
c∈(0,c¯)
{1 + F (c+ b¯
∗(c))
f(c+ b¯∗(c))
+ c− 2(1− F (c))2
∫ c+b¯∗(c)
0
(1−F (v1))f(v1)v1dv1}
Figure 13 shows the behavior of c¯ as a function of |e|. If c < c¯ then theorem 3
holds thus Πfc(0) > Πfc(b¯∗), otherwise the reverse is true.
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Figure 13: Upper bound of the cost for different distributions
Table 5: Revenue in Cash and Fixed-Cash as a function of e
Expected Seller Revenue
Distribution e Πfe(0) Πfc(b¯∗) b¯∗ e
U [0, 1]
−0.001 0.334333
0.3849 0.57735 −0.0512−0.01 0.343333
−0.1 0.433333
B[2, 2]
−0.001 0.372429
0.375 0.5 −0.0036−0.01 0.381429
−0.1 0.471429
B[2, 7]
−0.001 0.15002
0.152539 0.222329 −0.0035−0.01 0.15902
−0.1 0.24902
IB[2, 7]
−0.001 0.705575
0.656547 0.718398 @−0.01 0.714575
−0.1 0.804575
On table 5 we explore theorem 3 by showing the value of e for different dis-
tributions. Alongside, we present the values of Πfe(0) and Πfc(b¯∗) for different
values of e, to confirm why the bound is needed although it is rather low.
138
Proof of Theorem 4. We will prove the result using techniques of monotone com-
parative statics on lattice programming, for which we need to introduce some the
definitions and results of this theory.
Definition 6 (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)). Let X and T be non-empty subsets
of R and let g : X × T → R. We say g satisfies the strict single crossing
property (SSCP) in (x, t) if for every x′′, x′ in X and t′′, t′ in T , with x′′ > x′
and t′′ > t′
g(x′′, t′) ≥ g(x′, t′) implies g(x′′, t′′) > g(x′, t′′) (6)
and we write g(·, t′′) SSCP g(·, t′).
Definition 7 (Quah and Strulovici (2009)). Let X and T be non-empty subsets
of R, and let {g(·, t)}t∈T be a family of real valued functions defined on X, we say
that g(·, t′) is interval order dominated by g(·, t′′) -with the notation g(·, t′′) IDO
g(·, t′′)- if equation (6) holds for all x′ < x′′ whenever g(x, t′) < g(x′′, t′′) for all
x ∈ [x′, x′′].
Proposition 12 (Quah and Strulovici (2009)). Let X and T be respectively an
interval and a non-empty subsets of R, and suppose that {g(x, ·)}t∈T is a family
of real valued functions, which are also absolutely continuous in intervals of X;
and that there is a positive an increasing function h : X → R such that g′(x, t′′) >
h(x)g′(x, t′) a.e. Then, g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′)
Theorem 5 (Quah and Strulovici (2009)). Let X and T be non-empty subsets of
R and let g(·, t′′), g(·, t′) be two real valued functions defined on X, with t′′, t′ ∈ T
such that t′′ > t′. If g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′) then
argmaxx∈Jg(·, t′′) > argmaxx∈Jg(·, t′) for any interval J of X. (7)
Furthermore, if (7) is satisfied then g(·, t′′) IDO g(·, t′)
Suppose f1 dominates f0 in the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) and rewrite
(??) as
Πfe(α¯, t) = 2Ft(
c
1− α¯)
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
((1− α¯)v1 − c)ft(v1)dv1 (8)
+ 2Ft(
c
1− α¯)
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)ft(v1)dv1
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
[(1− α¯) min{v1, v2} − c− e+ α¯max{v1, v2}]ft(v1)ft(v2)dv1dv2
with t ∈ {0, 1}. It is sufficient to show that there exists a positive and increasing
function h(α) such that Πfeα (α, 1) > h(α)Πfeα (α, 0) to show that α∗1 ≥ α∗0, in virtue
of proposition 12 and theorem 5.
Define h(α, c) = f1(
c−e
1−α¯ )
f0( c1−α¯ )
and g(α, c) = F1(
c
1−α¯ )
F0( c1−α¯ )
. Notice that h(α, c) is increasing
in α for all c, and hence, if we show that Πfeα (α, 1)− h(α, c)Πfeα (α, 0) > 0 we can
conclude that Πfe(α, 1) IDO Πfe(α, 0) In order to show that, we can proceed
separately as we did with the derivative the proof of theorem 3.
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Thus, for the first term we have
2(c− e)e
(1− α¯)2 f(
c
(1− α¯)) [g(α, c)− h(α, c)]− 2
∫ c−e
1−α¯
c
1−α¯
v1[g(α, c)
f1(v1)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1
(9)
Likewise, the second term corresponds to
2(α¯c− e)
1− α¯
c− e
(1− α¯)2 [g(α, c)− h(α, c)] + 2
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
v1[g(α, c)
f1(v1)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1 (10)
The third term is equal to
2c
(1− α¯)2
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(α¯v1 − e)[ f1(v)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1 (11)
+
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
∫ v¯
c
1−α¯
(max{v1, v2} −min{v1, v2})[f1(v1)f1(v2)
f0(v1)f0(v2)
− h(α, c)]dv1dv2
Grouping the first terms in (9) and (10), respectively, we get
2α¯(c− e)2
(1− α¯)3 [g(α, c)− h(α, c)] (12)
Likewise, adding the second terms in (9) and (10) we obtain
2
∫ v¯
c−e
1−α¯
v1[g(α, c)
f1(v1)
f0(v1)
− h(α, c)]dv1 (13)
Terms (11)-(13) imply the result because we assume that g(α, c) > h(α, c), f0
is dominated in MLR by f1, and the inferior limit of all the integrals involved is
greater than or equal to c1−α¯ .
Applying the same argument, we can see that b¯∗1 > b¯∗0 if and only if
− 2b¯+ 1
λ0(c+ b¯)
1 + F0(c+ b¯)
F0(c+ b¯)
> h(b¯)[−2b¯+ 1
λ1(c+ b¯)
1 + F1(c+ b¯)
F1(c+ b¯)
] (14)
for h(·) increasing and positive.
Notice that as f1 dominates f0 in MLR then the hazard ratio is decreasing (i.e
λ0 < λ1). Moreover, it implies that F1 dominates F0 in first stochastic dominance
order (FOSD), which in turn implies that 1+F0(c+b¯)
F0(c+b¯)
< 1+F1(c+b¯)
F1(c+b¯)
. Therefore the
condition in (14) is satisfied for h(·).
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APPENDIX E - SIMULATION FOR DIFFERENT
DISTRIBUTIONS
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Following the results presented on figure 4.4, here we show the behavior of
revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for the main distributions considered in this
article. Figure 14 has the functions for a Beta[2, 2], figure 15 has the functions for
a Beta[2, 7] and figure 16 has the functions for an InverseBeta[2, 7]
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Figure 14: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for B[2, 2]
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Figure 15: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for B[2, 7]
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Figure 16: Revenue as a function of α¯ and b¯ for IB[2, 7]
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